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Judical Enforcement of the Housing
and Urban Development Acts
By

STEPHEN

F.

RONFELDT* AND

DENIS J. CLIFFORDt

THROUGH legislation going back to the Roosevelt era, the federal
government has sought to provide decent housing for all Americans.
The first Public Housing Act 1 was enacted in 1937 to provide "decent,
safe and sanitary housing" for low-income families.2 The Housing Act
of 1949, supplementing the 1937 legislation, proposed the elimination
of substandard housing through clearance and redevelopment programs,
and "the realization as soon as feasible of the goal of a decent home
and a suitable living environment for every American family."8
Clearly, these plans (or dreams) have not yet been achieved; indeed,
it can scarcely be said that we are progressing toward the realization
of these goals "as soon as feasible."'
The traditional explanation for the failure of federal housing programs has been inadequate funding. However, less attention has been
given to another failure of the public housing program-the misuse of
its funding. Despite the expenditure of relatively large sums of money,
the housing and redevelopment programs in large measure have failed
to provide housing for the intended beneficiaries of the program-the
*J.D.,

1967, University of California, Berkeley; Member, California Bar.

- J.D., 1966, Columbia University; Member, California Bar.
1. Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888, as amended, Housing Act of 1949,
ch. 338, 63 Stat. 413, as amended, Housing Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-70, 75 Stat.
153, as amended, Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-117,
79 Stat. 503, as amended, Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No.
90-448, 82 Stat. 504 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq.).
2. Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896, § 1, 50 Stat. 888.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (Supp. M, 1968), amending 42 U.S.C. 1441 (1964).
4. Exhaustive documentation of these failures has been made elsewhere. For a
history of the Housing Act of 1937 and an explanation of many of its present failures
see Friedman, Public Housing and the Poor: An Overview, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 642
(1966). For a review of relocation studies see Hartman, The Housing of Relocation
Families, 30 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 266 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Hartman].
See also NATIONAL COMM. AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING, How THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT BUILDS GHETTOS 6-7, 11-12, 19-27 (1967); Comment, Judicial Review
of Displacee Relocation in Urban Renewal, 77 YALE W. 966 (1968).
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low-income families in need of decent housing. Indeed, for those families in the greatest need of low-income housing, minority families with
many children, the Public Housing Act has done more harm than good.
Redevelopment programs have been used to demolish blighted
residential areas-not for the construction of low-income housing, but
for the construction of commercial centers, government buildings, luxury apartments, and even golf courses. Between 1949 and 1967,
404,000 dwelling units, mostly for low- and moderate-income households, were demolished under urban renewal programs. In place of
these demolished units, less than 75,000 low- or moderate-income units
have been built.' By 1966, over 35 percent of the project areas,
primarily residential before urban renewal, became primarily nonresidential after renewal.6 As a result of such programs, many low-income families were forced to move into substandard and crowded dwelling units at high rents. 7 Furthermore, "slum clearance" by redevelopment programs has largely brought about the displacement of Negroes;'
the percentage of displaced persons who are nonwhite is estimated to be
70 percent.9 Many of the redevelopment programs resulted in furthering segregated housing patterns by removing Negroes and other minority persons from nearby white middle class areas and forcing them
to relocate into poverty areas predominantly populated by minerity
groups. The search for rehousing in the large cities by many of the
Negro families, especially families with many children, has been futile."
Even where public housing has eventually been constructed, it is
often not open to low-income individuals, especially those with large
families. Because minimum rents are frequently set beyond the means
of low-income families,11 of the mere 700,000 units of public housing
in the nation, only 20 percent of the tenants occupying such housing
2
are on welfare.'
5. Hearings Before the National Comm'n on Urban Problems, vol. 1, at 160
(June-July, 1966).
6. Id. at 162.

7.
8.
9.
10.

11.

Hartman at 273-74.
D. THURSZ, WHERE ARE THEY Now? 5 (1966).
C. ABRAMS, THE CITY IS THE FRONTIER 136 (1965).
S.

GREER, URBAN RENEWAL AND AMERICAN CITIES

151 (1965).

For recent cases attacking local housing authority rent schedules see Oakland

Housing Tenant's Union v. Housing Authority, OEO Pov. L. REP. f 2620.35 (Cal.

Super. Ct., Alameda County, June 27, 1968) (housing authority charged rent in excess of 30 to 40 percent of tenant's income); Whitfield v. Housing Authority, OEO
Pov. L. REP. 2620.90 (N.D. Cal. 1967), which was a class action to enjoin a housing
authority from charging rent for the same facilities of $7-$17 per month more for persons on public welfare than for persons not on public welfare.
12. U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, STAT!STICAL YEARBOOK
1966, at 290.
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Low-income families with many children are also excluded from
public housing by the failure to build units large enough to house
them. 3 Other excluding factors have been admission policies and practices 4 that disqualify Negro families,' 5 families with illegitimate children, 16 poor housekeeping habits, poor rent paying habits, or criminal
backgrounds, 17 or families that have not resided in the community
for at least one and sometimes two or three years.' 8 In addition, public
housing increasingly has been provided for the elderly, rather than for
families with children. In the last 10 years, the proportion of elderly
persons in public housing has nearly doubled. Of the total public housing units in the nation, 32 percent are for the elderly.' 9
A final failure of the Public Housing Act is that even where lowincome families are fortunate enough to receive public housing, that
housing is rarely decent. Public housing is usually located in poor,
minority areas. 20 The housing projects, usually many stories high, are
13. In the City of Oakland, for example, the local housing authority in the
implementation of its Leased Housing Program can find very few private dwellings
that are in good repair and suitable for large families. The authors, as poverty lawyers
in Alameda County, have also noted that very few large, five bedroom units are being
built for the Turnkey Program due to the additional costs that must be borne by the
private developer in constructing larger units.
14. See generally Rosen, Tenants Rights in Public Housing, HOUSING FOp, THE

POOR:

RIGHTS AND REMEDIES

154, 157-81 (Supp. I, 1967).

15. See Banks v. Housing Authority, 120 Cal. App. 2d 1, 260 P.2d 668 (1953),
cert. denied, 347 U.S. 974 (1954) where the local housing authority (San Francisco)
was enjoined, on equal protection grounds, from refusing admission of Negroes to lowincome housing in white areas.
16. See Thomas v. Housing Authority, 282 F. Supp. 575, 580-81 (E.D. Ark.
1967), where it was held a violation of equal protection to automatically exclude an
unwed mother from low-income housing. The court stated in dictum, however, that an
unwed mother could be excluded if appropriate criteria were established.
17. A local housing authority may no longer automatically exclude admission to
unwed mothers, criminals, those with poor rent paying habits, etc. But they may
"[elstablish appropriate critera' in order to determine whether an individual would be
likely to interfere with the other tenants in their enjoyment of the premises. HUD
CmrRcuLAR Dec. 17, 1968. See text accompanying note 38 infra.
18. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 639-40 (1969) (struck down a one
year residency requirement for welfare recipients).
19. U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, STATISTICAL YEARBOOK
1966, at 264-65. HUD CIRCULAR, Oct. 10, 1968, states that in the 12 month period
ending September 30, 1968, 46 percent of low-rent public housing units were constructed for elderly occupants. However, only one-fourth to one-fifth of America's
poor are elderly; two-fifths of the poor are children under 18, and about one-half of
these poor children are in families of five or more.
20. See Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill.
1969), where the housing authority was enjoined from locating its units in poor,
segregated areas. The court noted: "Therefore, given the trend of Negro population
movement, 99'9o of CHA family units are located in areas which are or soon will be
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crowded into small areas and are of poor architectural design. Many
of the units rapidly deteriorate into a state of disrepair.21
A further aggravating feature is that tenants are almost never included in the management of their units or in the policy decisions affecting their homes and daily lives.22 The upsurge of tenants' unions,
organizations, and lawsuits against the housing and redevelopment
agencies" amply demonstrates the tenant's growing alienation from
the administration of his home.
The bleak picture painted above has resulted despite substantial,
though still far from adequate, federal funding in urban renewal and
public housing programs. Ironically enough, the laws behind the existing programs contain many specific provisions that, if enforced, would
lead to an improved state of low-income housing. The failure of the
program is due in large part to nonenforcement of existing policies.
Until these policies are enforced, and low-income housing improved and
made more attractive, both to those who live in such housing and to
the taxpayers, there is little political chance of increasing the funding
of these programs.
The questions then become: What are the types of statutory policies that should be enforced and what enforcement methods are pos24
sible?
substantially all Negro."

Id. at 910.

In another recent case, the Secretary of HUD was enjoined from making any further payments to the Bogalusa Housing Authority, because its housing project's sites
were chosen primarily for the purpose of perpetuating racial segregation. Hicks v.
Weaver, OEO Pov. L. REP. fI 10,039 (E.D. La., filed June 2, 1969).

21.

A few recent cases have attacked the local housing authorities for their fail-

ures to repair. See Banks v. Housing Authority, OEO Pov. L. REP.
2300.55 (Cal.
Super. Co., Alameda County, filed Dec. 22, 1967). In Earl v. Housing Authority, OEO

Pov. L. REP. %2345.58 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Francisco County, 1966) the tenants of a
public housing project withheld one month's rent and used the money to paint the exterior of a building owned by the authority. The court enjoined the authority from interfering with the painting. However, in a later action, Housing Authority v. Kennedy,

OEO Pov. L. REP.

1 2345.58 (Muni. Ct., San Francisco, Cal., 1967), the court entered

judgment against the tenants for the rent due.

22.
23.

See note 83 infra.

See generally F. GRAD, LEGAL REMEDIES FOR HousiNG CODE VIOLATIONS
125-48 (National Comm'n on Urban Problems, Report No. 14, 1968).

24. Since this article deals primarily with enforcement of the statutory provisions
of the Housing Act, a discussion of constitutional rights that might be alleged to accomplish changes in the enforcement of the Act has been omitted.

It should be noted,

however, that the government is a public landlord and cannot act arbitrarily and in
contravention of the rights of due process and equal protection of the laws. The cases
cited in notes 11, 12, 15, 17, and 20 supra, and in note 32 infra, all included constitutional issues.
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Laws Protecting Low-Income Persons in Need
of Decent Housing
The Housing Act has always contained provisions protecting and
benefiting low-income persons.2 5 Moreover, many beneficial provisions
have recently been enacted by Congress in the Housing Act of 196826
and by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUT)
pursuant to its rule-making authority as the agency responsible for administering the Housing Act. 7
In 1968, the Housing Act was amended to provide that the basic
purpose of redevelopment programs is to rehabilitate residential areas
rather than to build civic centers and business buildings. 28 For redevelopment programs involving residential rehabilitation, at least 50
percent of the dwelling units constructed must be for middle- and lowincome families, with a minimum 20 percent built for low-income families alone." In addition, cities are required to adopt an overall plan
for expanding their supply of housing.30
To assure adequate relocation for displaced persons, cities must provide one new unit for each unit demolished by its redevelopment program in areas with a vacancy rate of less than three percent for the
types of persons displaced." The local redevelopment agency must
provide a feasible plan for relocation facilities, 2 which must include the
assurance of suitable housing at a similar rent level and an appropriate
site.33 The local redevelopment agency is required to give the Secretary
of HUD satisfactory assurance that the agency's plan is feasible. 4 Finally, the city must develop a centrally administered relocation program
and provide relocation assistance, equal to that of urban renewal relocation assistance, to all persons displaced by governmental programs. 3 5
To assure that public housing will be available to low-income
25. See, for example, note 166 infra.
26. See, for example, note 166 infra.
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3531-37 (1964).
28. See Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 1460(c) (Supp. IV, 1969), which
states that no more than 35 percent of urban capital grants may be used to develop an
area for nonresidential uses. But in U.S. DEP'T op HoUSING AND URBAN DEVELOP[hereinafter cited as
MENT, URBAN RENEWAL HAmNooK RHA 7205.1, ch. 2 (1968)
HANDBOOK], the term "residential reuse" is very restrictively interpreted.
29. Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 1455(f) (Supp. IV, 1969).
30. HANDBOOK RHA 7100.1, ch. 6, q 3(b).
31. Id. RHA 71000.1, ch. 6, 3(c).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1455(c) (1) (Supp. IV, 1969).
33. See id. § 1455(c) (2); HANDBoox RHA 7212.1, ch. 2, I1(b)(4).
34. 42U.S.C. § 1455(c)(1) (Supp. IV, 1969).
35. HANDBOOK RHA 71000.1, ch. 6, 2.
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families, rents established by local housing authorities must be within
their financial reach, taking into consideration "family size, composition, age, physical handicaps, and other factors which might affect
the rent-paying ability of a family.

'36

Rents, however, cannot be set

so low that they will threaten the efficiency and solvency of the local
housing authority. 7 Furthermore, admission and eviction policies of
local housing authorities must be designed to exclude only those families that are "likely to interfere with other tenants in such a manner as
to materially diminish their enjoyment of the premises."3 s Large, lowincome families cannot be denied admission because of undesirable habits or backgrounds unless such factors would materially threaten other
tenants. Finally, low-income families are more assured of obtaining
low-income housing because HUD has given funding priority to local
housing agencies constructing units for larger families, with a resulting
lower priority given to units constructed for the elderly. 9
There are also provisions designed to improve the habitability of the
housing projects. The condition of the public housing must be "decent,
safe and sanitary."'
Public housing is to be architecturally designed
so that it will attract and retain most low-income families, not just the
poorest and most socially deprived.4 1 For this reason the construction of
highrise units will not be funded unless there is no practical alternative.4 2 In addition, public housing locations are prima facie unacceptable if they do not afford members of a minority group "an
opportunity to locate outside of areas of concentration of their own
group.

43

Finally, modernization grants are available for improving the physical condition of housing projects.
Basic objectives of the modernization grant are the updating and improvement of the local housing
authority's social and management policies and tenant participation both
36. 42 U.S.C. § 1402(1)(A) (Supp. IV, 1969).
37. Id. § 1402(l)(B).
38. HUD CIRCULAR, Dec. 17, 1968.
39. HUD CIRCULAR, Mar. 26, 1969.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 1402(2) (Supp. IV, 1969).
41. See DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, Low-RENT HOUSING
MANUAL § 221.1, Exhibit VI, at 1-3 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Low-RENT HOUSING
MANUAL].

42. 42 U.S.C. § 1415(11) (Supp.IV, 1969); HUD CIRCULAR, Sept. 18, 1968.
43. Low-RENT HOUSING MANUAL § 205.1(2) (g).
See Ranjel v. City of Lansing, 293 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Mich. 1969), where the court enjoined the use of
suburban restrictive zoning practices designed to keep low-income blacks from suburban communities.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1455(b) (Supp. III, 1968).
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in the use of45the modernization funds and in the employment created
by the grant.
Citizen participation, particularly for low-income and minority citizens, is required in all HUD-assisted programs.46 A guiding principle of HUD policy is to insure that citizens have the opportunity to
participate in policies and programs that affect their welfare. 47 A locality is required to establish appropriate organizational means for citi49
izen involvement. 48 Citizens must have access to decisionmaking
and must be provided with technical assistance so they may understand
programs and propose alternatives. 50 For each redevelopment program, Project Area Committees consisting of residents in the redevelopment area must be established and given a substantial voice in the
planning and programming of the redevelopment project. 51
Administrative Nonenforcement
Adequate administrative enforcement of the laws discussed above
might well begin to reverse some of the undesirable housing and redevelopment trends; unfortunately, there is little reason to expect that the
agencies responsible for their enforcement-HUD and the local agencies-will make vigorous efforts at enforcement. In fact, these administrative agencies have continually failed to enforce those laws designed to benefit and protect the low-income families.
The Local Agency
The structure of the Housing Act programs makes enforcement
difficult. The Housing Act places emphasis on local control by the com2
munity and gives the local agencies a maximum amount of autonomy.
Usually, separate local agencies administer the renewal programs (the
local redevelopment agency) and the housing programs (the local housing agency). These local agencies are incorporated by state enabling
legislation and are established by local government. 53 They are usually
45. DEP'T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT, Low-RENT MANAGEMENT MANpt. 1, § 1.9(2)-(3).
46. HANDBOOK RHA 7100.1, ch. 7, 1.
47. Id. 7217.1, ch. 5, § 1, 1.
48. See id. 7217.1, ch. 5, § 2, 1 l(a); id. 7387.1, ch. 1, ff 2(b).
49. See id. 7217.1, ch. 5, § 2, 2.
50. Id. 7217.1, ch. 5, § 2, 3.
51. Id. 7217.1, ch. 5, § 2, 11 1-3.
52. 42 U.S.C. § 1451(b) (Supp. IV, 1969).
53. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 34201, 34240. Only Wyoming and
Utah do not have such enabling legislation. HoUsING LAW PROJECT, MATERIALS ON
HousING LAW pt. I, § B, at 280 (Prelim. Draft 1969).
UAL
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run by a governing board, in which is vested all legal and discretionary
powers. 4 The board members, who are generally either elected by the
local community or appointed by the mayor, 5 are not required, however, to have any prior knowledge or experience with housing or redevelopment programs or to be representative of low-income persons.
Since the board members are elected by the general public or
appointed by the mayor, their policy decisions tend to reflect the views
of those in political control of the local community, whose interests are
very often in direct opposition to those of the low-income beneficiaries of
the Act. 6 For example, a mayor whose greatest concern is to "broaden
the tax base" might want to exclude as many poor people from the city
as possible. Such a mayor would thus be more attracted to the idea
of building civic centers and business buildings on cleared redevelopment property because such projects yield a much greater tax return
and create much less strain on local resources and services.
The board may additionally be affected in its decisions by the common, substantial community resistance to low-income housing due to
the economic ramifications it often creates. Public housing is often
considered a burden on municipal services and resources.57 At the
same time, public housing usually decreases the value of the tax base
of the property on which it is located and the property surrounding it.
Furthermore, the tenants of low-income housing often have no real
property or other resources that can be taxed locally.
A final factor that might affect the board is that occupancy of
public housing is felt by many to carry a social stigma, especially when
occupied by minority families with many children. No doubt, those
housing projects that have crowded numerous socially deprived and
minority families into poverty areas have been the foundation for social
problems, crime and even riots. Not surprisingly, those who live in
public housing frequently share many of the attitudes of the general
54.
55.

See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 34275.
E.g., id. §§ 34270-72. Under a recent California statute, the governing

body of any county or city may declare itself to be the commissioners of the housing
authority. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 34290.
56. One third of the local housing authority commissioners are of the opinion
that "the present number of [public housing] units is just about right." Hartman &
Gregg, Housing Authorities Reconsidered, 35 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 10, 13 (1969).
"A substantial number of Commissioners feel that families with multiple social problems do not belong in public housing at all, and very few feel that [local housing
authorities] ought to take direct responsibility for meeting the needs of those multiproblem families accepted." Id. at 17.
57. See generally NATIONAL HOUSING LAW PROJECT, MATERIALS ON HousING
LAW pt. I, § A, at 61-62 (Prelim. Draft 1969).
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public concerning their dwelling; they too resent the stodgy architecture,
the "dumping ground" psychology, and the inadequate repair policies.
The result of the above mentioned factors is that there is very little
political pressure on the administrative agencies to enforce the particular
statutory provisions that aid tenants or further expansion of low-income
housing. In addition, there is little possibility that low-income persons
can affect the administrative process themselves. The local administrators will not enforce the laws, nor will they allow low-income persons
a voice in their administration.
The actual administration of the local housing agencies is carlied out by a staff operating under a director. The director- is usually
appointed by the board members with approval from HUD.5s Since
the board members serve only on a part-time basis (possibly only once
a month) and often have little real knowledge of housing and redevelopment programs, the director establishes most of the policies, to which
the board gives its "rubber stamp" approval.5 9
Given these political realities, to most administrators (and their
small staff of professionals who carry out most of the plans) the welfare
of the tenant60or dislocated person is secondary to getting the job done
"efficiently."
Participation by citizens and low-income persons in
the formulation and administration of policies is regarded only as a
hindrance impeding the administrative procedure.
Lack of an Adequate Check by HUD
The Department of Housing and Urban Development often proves
equally impotent in enforcing essential statutory and even administrative policies. This failure arises from several causes, perhaps the most
basic one being the structure of HUD and the way it has defined its
role in the Housing Act programs."
Within HUD, an Assistant Secretary for Renewal and Housing
Assistance has overall charge of urban renewal and public housing programs. Seven regional offices handle local work, which includes re58.

NATIONAL

HOUSING LAW

PROJECT, MATERIALS ON

HOUSING

LAW

pt.

1,

§ B, at 280-81 (1969).
59. Id. For a general discussion of the structure of the Oakland Housing Authority see Note, The Oakland Leased Housing Program, 20 STAN. L. REV. 538,
539-41 (1968).
60. See Note, The Oakland Leased Housing Program, 20 STAN. L REv. 538,
562-63 (1968).
61. For a general description of the agency structure, see Bergen & Cogen, Responsive Urban Renewal: The Neighborhood Shapes the Plan, UanAN L. ANNUAL 1968,
at 75, 80-87.
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viewing many aspects of renewal or public housing programs.6 2 Only
the Secretary of HUD, however, has the statutory authority to give final
approval to such programs.6 a
Federal financing for HUD-assisted programs is provided by
means of a contract between HUD and the local agency-the "annual
contributions" contract.64 These contracts incorporate many of the
major statutory provisions of the applicable Housing Act as conditions
for funding.6 5 As far as HUD is concerned, these are the basic documents establishing the rights and duties of the local agencies. "
If
the requirements of these contracts are not met by the local agency,
HUD has the power to terminate the contract, thereby cutting off all
67
funds to the offending local agency.
HUD acts basically as an assistance agency, and provides minimal
enforcement of actual (as opposed to mere written) compliance with
the provisions of the Housing Acts. It does not initiate any action;
local agencies submit their redevelopment or housing plans to HUD,
which then reviews the application. 68 Moreover, HUD relies almost
entirely on information offered by the local agency. 9 This narrow informational channel frequently makes it impossible for HUD to learn
the actual, as opposed to the professed, intentions of the local agency, or
its compliance with both federal law and HUD's rules. While HUD
has some investigators, it does not have enough to adequately investigate the local programs. 70 Indeed, HUD normally follows the "maximum local participation" rule 7' to extremes. If a complaint is registered with HUD about a local agency practice, it merely refers the
complaint back to the local agency for a report.
62. These offices are located in New York, Philadelphia, Atlanta, Chicago,
Fort Worth, San Francisco and Puerto Rico. NATIONAL HoUSING LAW PROJECT, MATERIALS ON HOUSING LAW pt. I, § B, at 279 (1969).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 1451(c) (Supp. IV, 1969).
64. Id.§ 1410(a).
65. Id.§ 1410(b).
66. HUD has issued certain manuals and handbooks, such as HANDBOOK, note 28
supra, which create mandatory requirements supplementing the provisions of the
funding contracts; this is done pursuant to its rule making power under the Act. 42
U.S.C. § 1408 (1964).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 1415(3) (Supp. III, 1968).
68. Id.§§ 1451(b)-(e) (Supp.IV, 1969).
69. See C. ABRAMS, TiHE CITY IS THE FRONTIER 137-38 (1965). The author notes
that the Secretary's scrutiny is often nothing more than a rubber stamp process.
70. See id., where the author asserts that if the local relocation reports are
scrutinized, the analysis rarely goes beyond the four corners of the reports, with the result that many of the true housing conditions go undetected.
71. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
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Another reason for HUD's failure to effectively control local
agencies is its lack of suitable methods of enforcement. The only remedy available to HUD is the Draconian step of cutting off funds until
the agency complies with the law. 72 Theoretically, HUD could also demand immediate repayment from the local agency for a substantial
breach of condition or wilful violation of federal law,7" but as a practical
and political matter, no one ever expects this to occur. Suspending
financial aid and demanding repayment is too drastic for anything but
the most egregious breaches by the local agency. HUD is under many
of the same political and economic pressures that affect the local
agency. 4 Furthermore, it has committed itself to working with the local
agency, and has usually begun to work on the plans itself.75 The pervasive feeling that "we experts can resolve our problems in a friendly,
nondisruptive manner" is a formidable barrier to vigorous supervision
by one bureaucratic agency over another.
Lack of AdministrativeParticipationby Low-Income Persons
The final inadequacy in the scheme of administrative control over
the Housing Act is the almost complete lack of methods by which
aggrieved private citizens, such as tenants and dislocatees, can seek
administrative review of, and action on, their complaints. HUD does
not have any established hearing procedure to permit injured persons to
challenge the legality of local agency actions or plans.76 Some conferences and changes have come about by the filing of a formal complaint with the Secretary of HUD, but this has been purely on an ad hoc
basis. 77 No hearing is required by the statute before any HUT) action.
Whatever action HUT) takes, and whatever investigation it will make, is
entirely at its own discretion,7" which realistically depends almost en72.

42 U.S.C. § 1415(3) (Supp. 11,

73.

Id. § 1415(1).

1968).

74. See text accompanying notes 55-56 supra.
75. For example, C. ABRAMS, supra note 69, at 137, hypothesizes that even when
relocation procedures are recognized as inadequate, the Secretary will rarely substitute his judgment for that of the local renewal agency.
76. There is, however, a procedure for review of complaints alleging racial discrimination, pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d, 2000d-1

(1964).
77. See generally Tondro, Urban Renewal Relocation: Problems in Enforcement
of Conditions on Federal Grants to Local Agencies, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 183, 202-05
(1968).
78. But see Powelton Civic Home Owners Ass'n v. HUD, 284 F. Supp. 809,
829-32 (E.D. Pa. 1968), in which the plaintiff alleged that the Secretary had refused
to consider the plaintiff's complaint against a local housing authority before granting
funds; the court held that the Secretary's decisions must be fair, and this necessitates
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tirely upon how much political heat the complainants can generate. This
means that while there may be some chance of private individuals or
groups obtaining HUD action on a major issue such as an entire redevelopment program, lesser but still important problems will not be
amenable to such treatment.
At the local level, unlike most other administrative agencies, local
housing and redevelopment agencies do not have a standard procedure
for the resolution of grievances. The governing board usually holds
public meetings at regular intervals,79 but their purpose is to discuss
policies, not individual complaints. If a tenant or a dislocated person
has a grievance, he can only register his complaint, which, more than
likely, will be handled informally by the very administrators who were
the source of the problem in the first place.
Although there usually are hearings before a redevelopment program is implemented, ° they too are inadequate.8 ' The hearing is held
only after the plans have been drawn up and substantial sums expended
in planning and surveying the projected redevelopment area. Furthermore, those attending the hearing often do not have the expertise necessary to suggest specific alternate plans; they often have the impression
(usually accurate) that the purpose of the hearing is simply to let them
air their grievances, not to affect the actual course of the development
plan.
If the administrative bodies were partially comprised of representatives from the interested low-income community, even these informal
or inadequate procedures might be of significant value. As previously
mentioned, however, those who make the decisions are either administrators or politically chosen persons from totally distinct backgrounds.8
Recently, many tenant groups have demanded that low-income tenants
of public housing be placed on the governing boards of these bodies.
These demands, in most cases, have been met with evasiveness or outhis exposure to viewpoints oth'er tha'n tie local authority's. See text accompanying
notes 94-95 infra.
79. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 34283.
80. See 42 U.S.C. § 1455(d) (1964); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33363.
81. See generally C. ABRAMS, note 69 supra, at 140-45; Sullivan, Administrative
Procedure and the Advocatory Process in Urban Redevelopment, 45 CALIF. L. REv.
134, 143-49 (1957). See also Note, Urban Renewal: Problems of Eliminating and
Preventing Urban Deterioration,72 HARv. L. REv. 504, 513-15 (1959); Note, Judicial
Review of Displacee Relocation in Urban Renewal, 77 YALE L.J. 966 (1968); Note,
Judicial Review of Urban Redevelopment Agency Determinations, 69 YALE L.J. 321

(1959).
82.

See text accompanying notes 55-56 supra.
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right hostility.88 Some agencies have even claimed that there is a potential "conflict of interest" in placing any tenant on the governing
board. 4 The argument to the contrary, however, that placement of an
affected low-income person on the governing board would assure
that at least one member has personal knowledge of the needs and
preferences of those affected by the board's decisions, seems the more
logical and persuasive.
In redevelopment programs, federal law requires some participation
by residents of affected areas. A "Project Area Committee" (PAC),
consisting of residents of the redevelopment area, must be established
by requirement of federal law. 5 If effectively used, the PAC might
provide a significant method for citizens to influence the administrative
process, and thereby compel enforcement of federal law. However,
experience to date suggests that the effectiveness of the PAC will be
limited. The PAC members are often chosen (hand-picked) by the
political powers in the city undergoing the redevelopment, and they
serve to reflect the views of the politically powerful, not the local
residents. The PAC's activities (and continued membership on the
PAC) are frequently subject to the political approval of those hostile
to the interest of low-income persons.8 6 Moreover, the members of the
PAC are usually not given any technical assistance to enable them to
evaluate a redevelopment program. Consequently, they cannot act as
an effective balance to the plans and voices of the "experts."
The overall administrative picture in the federal housing and development area is thus a bleak one. There is little chance for vigorous enforcement by HUD or local agencies of the substantive rights of
low-income groups and almost no possibility that the private citizen
can compel agency action. These realities suggest that unless the courts
act, there will be no enforcement. Historically, it has not been easy to
obtain court review of federal housing programs. An examination of the
reasons for these difficulties follows, with suggestions on how the courts
should play a meaningful role in this area.
83.

At present only six local housing authorities have public housing tenants

serving as commissioners.

NATIONAL HOUSING LAW PROJECT, MATERLALS ON HOUSING

LAw pt. I, § B, at 278 n.5 (1969).
84. Members of the governing board can have no contract or arrangement concerning their local agency. HUD CiRCULAR, May 15, 1968); HUD CiRCULAR, Jan. 1,
1959.
1-3; see text accompanying note 51
85. HANDBOOK RHA 7217.1, ch. 5, § 2,
supra.
86. See Hartman & Carr, Housing Authorities Reconsidered, 35 J. Am. INsT.
PLANNERs 13-17 (1969).
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Judicial Enforcement of the Housing Act
Exhausting Administrative Remedies and Compelling Hearings
Before courts will review an agency action or decision, it must be
"final"; administrative remedies must be exhausted.17 At the local
agency level, there is usually no formal procedure for the resolution
of individual grievances, except possibly for evictions. 88 The only hearing procedure prescribed by law is the periodic (usually once a month)
meeting of the governing boards, which are open to the public. 9 These
meetings are for the purpose of considering policy matters and rarely
include a consideration of isolated individual grievances. To assure
exhaustion of this remedy, one should probably request the consideration of the grievance by the governing board if it is an individual matter, and should definitely do so if the grievance concerns a policy
matter.
As noted above, HUD has no statutory procedure for hearings or
for the resolution of grievances, except for cases involving racial discrimination.9" A formal complaint may be filed before the Secretary
and it may be heard, but only as a matter of grace. Where the administrative remedy is inadequate or unavailable, there is generally no
legal requirement that the administrative remedies be exhausted. 9 Certainly, for isolated individual grievances there is no requirement that
HUD be requested to consider the matter. On policy matters, however, HUD usually requires its approval where the implementation of
the policy will require the expenditure of additional funds. In these
cases, courts would probably be reluctant to review the matter until
HUD has given approval or disapproval.
Exhaustion of the administrative remedy is not required if the
grievance is based on a violation of the complainant's constitutional
rights. 92 In addition, exhaustion may not be required if the complain93
ant is suffering immediate, irreparable harm.
Although exhaustion of the administrative remedy may not be required in many instances, it may be very advantageous for tactical rea87.

5 U.S.C. § 704 (Supp. III, 1968).

For a general discussion see 3 K.

DAVIS,

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 20.01 (1958).
88. See HUD CIRCULAR, Feb. 7, 1967.
89. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 34283.

90. See note 76 & accompanying text supra.
91. See, e.g., Anthony Grace & Sons v. United States, 345 F.2d 808 (Ct. C1.
1965), rev'd on other grounds, 384 U.S. 424 (1966); Sunshine Publication Co. v. Summerfield, 184 F. Supp. 767 (D.D.C. 1960).
92. See Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1969).
93. See cases cited note 91 supra.
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sons. It is possible that after receiving information from a source other
than the local agency, HUD might disapprove the local agency action.
At least, if a hearing were held, HUD's position on this dispute over
regulations and statutory requirements would be clarified. Finally, if
all possible attempts to exhaust the administrative remedy are made by
the complainant, the court is in a better position, and probably more
willing, to rule for the complainant.
If HUD refuses to hold a hearing, it can probably be compelled
to do so. In Powelton Civic Home Owners Association v. Department
of Housing and Urban Development,9 4 the Secretary of HUD refused
to hold a hearing and receive complaints from residents of a redevelopment area who were threatened with relocation. The court compelled
the Secretary to receive the plaintiffs documentary evidence relating to
the insufficiency of the local agency's plan for relocation, stating:
[I]f the Secretary is statutorily obligated to make decisions on the
project's compliance with federal prerequisites, then he is implicitly
obligated by due process to make fair, non-arbitrary decisions.
It has been observed that if the Secretary fails to adopt procedures
which would expose him to viewpoints other than those of the local
agency, his decision is inherently susceptible to a due process
attack. 95
Under the reasoning in Powelton, it would seem that in any cases where
HUD must give its approval to an action, decision, or program of the
local agency, HUD could be compelled to receive evidence from the
complainants; provided, however, that HUD continues to base its decisions primarily on data submitted by the local agency rather than
on adequate, independent investigations, or on the record made at
local hearings.96
Hearings may also be compelled under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).91 In Gart v. Cole,9 8 the court recognized that residents of a redevelopment area have the right under the APA to submit
documentary evidence contesting the local authority's relocation plan.
The relevant APA provision requires that "interested persons be given
an opportunity to participate . . . with or without opportunity for oral
presentation."9 9 In Powelton, however, the court stated that this sec94. 284 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1968). The facts of this case are discussed more
fully in the text accompanying notes 183-85 infra.
95.

284 F. Supp. at 831.

96. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1451(b), (e) (Supp. IV, 1969). See generally Note, Protecting
the Standing of Renewal Site Families to Seek Review of Community Relocation
Planning,73 YALE Li. 1080, 1090 (1964).

97.
98.
99.

Ch. 324, §§ 1-12, 60 Stat. 237 (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
263 F.2d 244 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 978 (1959).
5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (Supp. I, 1967).
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tion could not apply to agency proceedings involving "loans, grants,
benefits, or contracts."'
This position seems untenable because such
a nonapplication would exempt any government programs funded
through loans, grants, benefits, or contracts from judicial review. 10 '
Notwithstanding the Powelton language, what seems intended from this
provision is that the court will not review internal matters dealing with
the actual framing and preparation of contracts, or with contracts affecting only the internal administration of the program. The remainder of
the APA section, stating that the court will not review matters dealing
with internal administration, supports this construction. 0 2
The difficult problem concerns the type of hearing that may be
obtained. In both Gart and Powelton, the court only indicated that the
Secretary had to receive documentary evidence. Both cases rejected
the requirement of individual oral hearings on the ground that the
decisions involved policies affecting a group rather than findings of fact
related solely to an individual determination. 0 3 Only in matters concerning individual determinations is it necessary to have an oral hearing with complete rights of cross-examination and subpoena, and the
right to written findings of fact. 04 The Powelton court noted that as a
practical matter, numerous oral hearings for each dislocated person
would be a burden to the agency and would serve no practical purpose
for the residents.'
While a personal appearance before the agency,
even by the whole group of dislocated persons, may not be crucial, it is
important to have the opportunity to rebut the findings and allegations
of the local agency, especially when they are framed in a self-serving
and deceptive manner. It is also important to be able to produce or
have direct access to the relevant evidence since many agency documents and decisions are often not easily accessible to members of the
public. Furthermore, a hearing is of little use to the court upon review
unless the findings and decision are made clear and provide a record for
the court.
Not to allow a full-scale hearing just because the issue in contro100. 284 F. Supp. at 830.
101. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (Supp. 11, 1967), which exempts from the coverage
of APA "a matter relating to agency management or personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts."
102. Id. § 553(3)(A).
103. Gart v. Cole, 263 F.2d 244, 250-51 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 359 U.S. 978
(1959); Powelton Civic Home Owners Ass'n v. HUD, 284 F. Supp. 809, 830-31 (E.D.
Pa. 1968).
104. See generally 1 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 576-603 (1958).
105. 284 F. Supp. at 830.
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versy involves primarily a policy or group determination is an unfortunate, mechanical approach; yet it has been taken in most cases. For
example, while decisions relating to relocation, rents, or repairs involve
policy determinations affecting groups, the policies must be made to fit
the needs of particular individuals because the impact of such decisions may be felt dramatically on an individual basis. Moreover, it
would not harm HUD to hold a single group hearing, or even a hearing without oral presentations but with full discovery, written rebuttals,
written decisions, and findings of fact. 10 6 There is little question that
these additions would lead to fairer decisions, would improve the responsiveness of HUD toward those whom it is supposed to serve, and
would facilitate review by the courts.
Jurisdiction
State Courts
The Housing Act does not restrict jurisdiction over actions arising
under it to the federal courts. State courts, therefore, can enforce federal rights in suits brought by private parties"0 7 when the court has
appropriate jurisdiction over the parties. 08 For example, if a local
housing project violates HUD regulations in an individual eviction case,
the tenant could raise this federal claim in a state court action, either
as a defense to an eviction, or in an affirmative suit for injunctive or
declaratory relief. 109 Similarly, if a redevelopment agency in an individual case violated HUD relocation requirements, the relocated individual could raise this in a suitable state court case.110
There are, however, several problems with placing primary reliance
106. See OEO Pov. L. REP.
1610.15, where, in arguing against termination
of welfare benfits prior to hearings, it was stated: "[Tlhe sole interest of the
government in delaying a hearing until after assistance has been discontinued is financial ....
Against this purely financial interest must be weighed the compelling interest of the individual in a hearing before the state discontinues welfare benefits."
The magnified hardship that a person must bear in being relocated under an inadequate plan is apparent. Thus the need for a hearing in this area is most acute.
107. The state courts would probably apply federal standing to sue standards,
since the issue of standing would bear substantially on the question whether the litigation would come out differently in state and federal courts. Cf. Byrd v. Blue Ridge
Rural Elec. Cooperative, 356 U.S. 525, 536-37 (1958).
108. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947); Miller v. Municipal Court, 22 Cal. 2d
818, 851, 142 P.2d 297, 316 (1943); Wasservogel v. Meyerowitz, 300 N.Y. 125, 133-34,
89 N.E.2d 712, 716-17 (1949).
109. Cf. Louisville Municipal Housing Comm'n v. Murphy, OEO Pov. L. REP.
112245.20 (Cir. Ct. of Jefferson County, Ky., 1967).
110. E.g., King v. Mayor of Rockville, OEO Pov. L. REP. f 2725.70 (Md. Ct. App.
1968).
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on state courts to enforce federal rights. The most important is that
HUD cannot be made a defendant. A federal agency can be served
and sued only where a statute expressly permits.'
Like all federal
cabinet agencies, HUD can be served and sued in the federal district
court in Washington, D.C." 2 or it can sometimes be sued in the federal
district court where the plaintiff resides."' There is, however, no statutory authority for HUD to be served or sued in a state court, and these
courts are thus without in personam jurisdiction over it.
Lack of state court jurisdiction over HUD produces several unfortunate consequences where there is an attempt to enforce federal law
in a state court. If the issue to be resolved presents a major question of
statutory construction and social policy rather than an individual case of
noncompliance with unchallenged rules, the court's effectiveness is
severely limited by HUD's absence. The only effective remedy would
be a mandatory injunction against the local agency to be enforced by
the contempt power-a difficult remedy to obtain, since judges are reluctant to place public officials in jail. The court, however, could
neither enjoin the federal funding of a program nor order appropriate
procedural or remedial steps to be taken by HUD.
Moreover, many important cases arise as a result of HUD's
administrative approval of local agency plans, and the most appropriate and effective type of court review is a direct challenge to the agency
action before the plans are actively put into effect. Again, such review
is only available in federal court, with HUD as a defendant. For example, in urban renewal programs, HUD is intimately involved in all stages
of the plans. Without HUD present, the court, having an insufficient
record and not knowing HUD's position, would be understandably reluctant to intervene, especially if there were a possibility that HUD
might later disapprove the plan.
There are additional hindrances to state court action. Many of the
key statutory phrases are far from clear, and a state court may prove
quite reluctant to interpret a difficult question of federal policy. In
particular, a state court may be inclined to accept any continuation or
action by HUD.
Finally, there is the belief of many that, at least in some areas of
the country, federal judges are generally more sympathetic to, and understanding of, the social issues raised in these suits. In addition, a
precedent from a federal court may be more persuasive than one from
111.

3 K.

DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE

112. 28 U.S.C. § 1402(a)(1) (1964).
113. Id. § 1402(a)(2).

t 27.02 (1959).
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a local state court. Plaintiff's belief, however, that federal courts are
a more desirable forum and his desire to have it heard there will not
always be sufficient to guarantee that the matter will be heard there.
Federal Courts
In order to bring suit in federal court, plaintiffs must allege a
specific jurisdictional basis. 114 Meeting this requirement may prove
to be difficult in many cases, thus leaving no alternative but to seek
enforcement through the state courts. There are some cases, however, that can clearly be brought in federal court, and several recent
housing cases have indicated that the federal courts are willing to
attempt to resolve important issues of federal statutory construction.
The Civil Rights Provision
The clearest case of federal court jurisdiction is when the plaintiff
alleges that the actions or policies of a local housing authority violate
provisions of the Civil Rights Act." 5 In these cases, plaintiff makes
the familiar allegation that the defendants acted under color of state
law to deprive him of a constitutional right; such allegations have been
held to be a proper basis for jurisdiction in many housing suits.'" Cases
involving discriminatory admission policies, eviction policies, and possibly local residency requirements could all be attacked on this basis.
A basic advantage of obtaining civil rights jurisdiction is that it
also allows statutory claims to be heard. The simplest case is where the
statute, or regulation, prohibits the same practices as the alleged constitutional violation. 1 7 Furthermore, it would seem that additional, but
factually separate, federal statutory claims involving the same defendants could be included, provided there was jurisdiction over the constitutional claim. For instance, if a tenant were being summarily evicted
114. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
115. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1964).
116. E.g., Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill.
1969); Thompson v. Housing Authority, 251 F. Supp. 121 (S.D. Fla. 1966); Vann v.
Toledo Metropolitan Housing Authority, 113 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ohio 1953).
117. E.g., Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 386 U.S. 670 (1967). In that case the
plaintiff alleged that she had been evicted from her low-rent apartment without any
explanation; she contended the reason for this eviction was her participation in constitutionally protected associational activities. The court, in a per curiam decision,
remanded the case to the state court with instructions to follow the procedures outlined in a previously issued HUD directive, which required that the tenant be given the
reasons for any eviction and afforded an opportunity to defend or explain.
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from public or leased housing for demanding that repairs be made,"'
it would seem proper for the court to consider both the constitutionality
of the eviction and the tenant's statutory claim that the housing authority was obligated to bring his dwelling up to a certain level of repair.
Moreover, related claims involving the same parties but governed by
state law could also be litigated under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. 1 9
However, it seems that constitutional claims will not involve many
of the basic issues concerning the improvement of public housing and
redevelopment projects. It is difficult to see how any equal protection
or due process claim can be made on the basic issues of citizen participation, repair and rehabilitation policies, and design and architecture
of new construction. Likewise, the instances where these claims could
be combined with a bona fide constitutional claim would appear to be
few in number. Most courts enforcing federal housing legislation,
therefore, will have to assert jurisdiction on some other basis.
The APA Provision
Another possible source of federal court jurisdiction is the Administrative Procedure Act,120 which provides that where there are no,
or inadequate, statutory requirements for review 121 "[t]he form of proceeding for judicial review is . . . any applicable form of legal action
.
• . . in a court of competent jurisdiction ....
This presents the problem of what constitutes a "court of competent jurisdiction." Some courts have held that this means there must
be some jurisdictional basis other than the APA. 2' -3 Several recent
118. See Rucreto v. Alid, Inc., OEO Pov. L. REP. 9454 (N.J. Super. Ct., Hudson
County, 1969) (report to health authorities of rodent infestation resulted in substantial
rent increase).
119. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). "Pendent jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial power, exists whenever there is a claim 'arising under
and the relationship be[the] Constitution [orl the laws of the United States.'
tween that claim and the state claim permits the conclusion that the entire action before the court comprises but one constitutional 'case.' The federal claim must have
The state
substance sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court ....
and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact. But if, considered without regard to their federal or state character, a plaintiff's claims are such
that he would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding, then,
assuming substantiality of the federal issues there is power in federal courts to hear
the whole." Id. at 228-29.
120. Ch. 324, §§ 1-12, 60 Stat. 237 (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
121. It has already been noted that statutory provisions for review of HUD local
authority action are inadequate. See text accompanying notes 98-106 supra.
122. 5 U.S.C. § 703 (Supp. III, 1968).
123. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 392 F.2d 483 (D.C. Cir. 1968);
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recases, however, have taken a more enlightened view, holding 2that
4
view of final agency action can be grounded directly on the APA.:
The APA itself is silent, neither expressly conferring nor explicitly denying jurisdiction to the federal courts. The courts opposing jurisdiction under the APA basically argue that federal jurisdiction is narrowly prescribed, and must be expressly created.1 25 This
seems far too narrow a view. The intention of the APA to provide
for some court review of administrative action is unquestionable. If a
review of a federal administrative action is not possible in a federal
court, it will usually not be possible at all because of the venue and
service problems relating to HUD in a state court. 1 26 Consequently,
since it is possible as a matter of statutory construction to read jurisdiction into the APA,127 it should be done to check arbitrary agency actions and to safeguard the rights of individuals.
Assuming jurisdiction can be obtained under the APA, only HUD
would appear to be an appropriate defendant in such actions; the local
agency is not covered by the APA. But, it would do little good to sue
HUD in cases where the affirmative remedy must be applied against
the local agency; for instance, in cases involving a failure to repair.
Finally, only in those cases where the plaintiffs have been injured by
"final" agency action could suit be brought.' 28 The clearest example
of an APA case would be HUD's approval of an illegal relocation in
an urban renewal plan. However, for the difficult problem of HUD
inaction or the local agency's failure to repair, the APA would be of
no assistance because there is no "final" agency action by HUD.
The Mandamus Provision
Another possible source of federal jurisdiction, the "mandamus"
provision, provides as follows:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in
the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the
Gustavsson Contracting Co. v. Floette, 278 F.2d 912 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
894 (1960); Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 884 (1955).
124. Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 356 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1966); Toilet Goods Ass'n v.
Gardner, 360 F.2d 677, 679 n.1 (2d Cir. 1966); Powelton Home Owners Ass'n v.
HUD, 284 F. Supp. 809, 820 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
125. REA v. Northern States Power Co., 373 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1967); Kansas
City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
884 (1955).
126. See text accompanying notes 111-13 supra.
127. See cases cited note 124 supra.
128. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (Supp. 1I, 1968).
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United States
or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the
129
plaintiff.
This section has been interpreted by some courts to apply only to
"ministerial" duties. 3 In addition, the scope of the remedy permitted
under this section, being limited to affirmative orders, may not include the type of injunctive relief required. 3 ' This provision could be
more liberally interpreted to permit mandatory orders; yet, since most of
the statutory terms sought to be enforced in the housing area are far
from precise and clear, mandamus probably will not lie." 2
Basically the "mandamus" provision is redundant if there is jurisdiction under the APA, since both provisions deal with the same kind
of cases-federal agency action. 1 33 If there is HUD inaction (i.e.,
no "final" action in APA terms) resulting in failure to enforce a clear
policy against a local housing authority, then section 1361 (the "mandamus" provision) might be useful. Only if APA jurisdiction is rejected would section 1361 normally be important; but a court which
has rejected APA jurisdiction would be unlikely to give a liberal reading
to section 1361.
The Federal Question Provision

The last possible ground for obtaining federal jurisdiction is the
presence of a federal question."' To obtain jurisdiction on this basis,
plaintiffs must allege a claim "arising under" a federal statute, and the
"amount in controversy" must be over $10,000.
The first requirement presents little problem." 5 Plaintiffs would
base their claim directly on a provision of the Federal Housing Act, or
regulations of HUD promulgated under it. Under the established doctrines a federal question is thereby raised. Moreover, the courts that
129. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1964).
130. Armstrong v. United States, 233 F. Supp. 188, 190 (S.D. Cal. 1964), a!l'd,
354 F.2d 648 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 946 (1965); Sprague Elec. Co. v. Tax
Court, 230 F. Supp. 779, 782 (D. Mass. 1964). In addition, the duty sought to be
compelled by mandamus must be so plainly prescribed as to be free from doubt-it
must be the equivalent of a positive command. See Prairie Band of Pottawatomie
Tribe v. Udall, 355 F.2d 364 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 831 (1966).
131. Harms v. FHA, 256 F. Supp. 757 (D. Md. 1966).
132. E.g., REA v. Northern States Power Co., 373 F.2d 686 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 387 U.S. 945 (1967).
133. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (Supp. II, 1967) provides: "Agency action made reviewable
by statute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a
court are subject to judicial review."
134. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1964).
135. Ivy Broadcasting Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 391 F.2d 486 (2d Cir.
1968).
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have been presented with such claims have assumed that a proper federal claim was alleged. 3 '
The $10,000 requirement presents greater difficulty. In a rare instance (perhaps a relocation case) plaintiff could perhaps allege specific, individual damages in excess of $10,000, but in most cases it will
be difficult for any individual plaintiff to allege the necessary amount.
Only if more speculative damages were allowed-the ultimate cost to a
child of being reared in substandard housing, or of being "relocated" in
new and inferior housing-could this requirement normally be met by a
single individual. Generally, the courts refuse to allow such speculative
13 7
damages to be used to determine the jurisdictional amount.
The best possible way to meet the $10,000 requirement would be
to aggregate the damages of all individual members of a class action
pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The cumulative damages to all potential dislocated persons, or all members of
substandard public or leased housing, would readily be over $10,000.
Although not quite so immediately ascertainable, the damages involved in other violations of federal policy, such as a denial of citizen
participation rights, would often amount to more than $10,000. To
illustrate, for a local housing authority to obtain a modernization grant,
HUD requires that it develop a plan to permit both increased tenant participation in the management of the property and increased employment
of low-income residents in public housing operations. 38 If the local
housing authority was denied an application for a $1,000,000 modernization grant, then clearly the potential damage to the class (all residents
of the public housing project where these policies are violated) would
be in excess of $10,000, one one-hundredth of the total amount in question. If an individual brought this suit, however, it would be difficult
to show that he suffered $10,000 in damages, especially when it cannot be shown that he, aside from other members of the class, would
have obtained a job through the modernization program.39
In the case of Snyder v. Harris,4 ' the Supreme Court held that the
question is not what the amount in controversy is for the class under
Rule 23, but what the amount in controversy is in terms of the
applicable jurisdictional provision. The Court refused to allow an
136.

See, e.g., Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 386 U.S. 670 (1967).

137. Cf. Rosado v. Wyman, 414 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1969), where indirect damage
caused to welfare recipients by a New York statute was deemed to be too speculative to
support jurisdiction.
138.

See text accompanying notes 46-50 supra.

139. See text accompanying notes 44-46 supra.
140. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
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aggregation of damages in class action diversity suits where the claims
were separate and distinct, holding that Rule 23 could have no effect
on the jurisdictional limits of diversity.''
Snyder does not mean, however, that damages can never be aggregated in cases where jurisdiction is based on a federal question. There
were genuine practical concerns in Snyder clearly distinguishable from
a class action seeking to enforce federal housing rights. In Snyder, the
substantive claim was one of state law, and only diversity of citizenship
brought the suit into federal court. The Supreme Court was obviously
reluctant to "open the floodgates" to various diversity class suits in the
federal courts where the substantive law of the state must be applied.' 42
In the types of cases we are discussing, however, the underlying claim
involves a federal question arising under the Federal Housing Act.
Nevertheless, although these fears of being flooded by diversity cases
may be the real basis for Snyder, its holding also appears to include
those cases involving federal questions. 14 3
In Snyder, the Court stated not only that it is "settled doctrine"
that "separate and distinct" claims cannot be aggregated, but also that
the "lower courts have developed largely workable standards for determining when claims are joint and common, and therefore entitled to
be aggregated, and when they are separate and distinct, and therefore
not aggregable."' 4 4 In fact, the lower courts have not developed a
body of doctrine that covers the type of cases that arise under the
Housing Act. 4 5 Most aggregation cases in the past have involved diversity suits, and the case law often revolves around "a perpetuation of
distinctions which the profession had hoped would become only curiosities of the past." '46
The difficulty in applying the old case law to the social problems
141. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964) grants jurisdiction to United States district courts
over suits between citizens of different states when "the matter in controversy
exceeds the sum or value of $10,000 ....
142. 394 U.S. at 340: "The result would be to allow aggregation of practically
any claims of any parties that for any reason happen to be brought together in a single
action. This would seriously undercut the purpose of jurisdictional amount requirement. The expansion of the federal caseload could be most noticeable in class actions brought on the basis of diversity of citizenship." Id.
143. Id. at 342 & n.2 (Fortas, J., dissenting); see id. at 341.
144. Id. at 341.
145. See generally Davis, Standing to Challenge Government Actions, 39 MINN. L.
REv. 353 (1955); Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 HARv.
L. REV. 255 (1961); Lewis, Constitutional Rights and the Misuse of Standing, 14
STAN. L. REV. 433 (1962); Sedler, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in the
Supreme Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599 (1962).
146. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 333, 346 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
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presented by the enforcement of housing legislation is demonstrated by
the recent case of PotreroHill Community Action Committee v. Housing
Authority.'4 7 The plaintiffs in Potrero Hill, all tenants of the San
Francisco Public Housing Project, alleged that the housing authority
had failed to fulfill its statutory and contractual obligation to maintain the project in a "decent, safe and sanitary" condition. Jurisdiction
was alleged for the class action under the federal question provision of
section 1331, title 28 of the United States Code. The court stated that
the issue to be resolved was "whether a tenant in the Potrero Hill Project
has a 'single right' shared with other tenants similarly situated as to
which all have a 'common and undivided interest.' "148 The court
recognized that commercial interest cases were not a clear guide to resolution of the problem.'49 It declared that the proper approach is to
distinguish "between interests which could only be asserted by pluralistic
entities as such and interests which were asserted by individuals but
50
which involved questions of fact and law common to the group."''
51
Relying on a group of cases arising out of wartime rent control,' the
court held that the plaintiffs' claims did not derive from rights that
they held in group status. The court reasoned that plaintiffs' rights
appear to arise only from the status of each as individual lessee
of a portion of the project premises. Each project resident holds his
own lease which confers benefits on the one hand and prescribes
duties and obligations on the other .... 152
Noticeably lacking in the court's analysis of the "interest" of the
plaintiffs is any examination of the source of the statutory right in
question. In addition, the court gave no explanation for the relevance
of a plaintiff's individual leasehold interest to a determination of whether
the class has a "common interest" in enforcing a specific statutory
policy. The right to "decent, safe and sanitary" housing is a right
created by federal law and shared by many. Essentially, this is a
"new property" right which involves the government's creation of social
wealth. As pointed out in other contexts, this type of property interest
is far different from traditional "private" property.' 53 It is difficult
to distinguish between social benefits conferred on a group simply by
analysis of older cases involving government rent control during wartime.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

410 F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1969).
Id. at 977.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 978.
Id.
See generally Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
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Even though there was a common benefit shared by the class
suing in Potrero, the outcome of that decision (aside from its reasoning)
may have been correct; the state court may have been a more acceptable
forum. For each member of the class, there had to be a determination
of whether his dwelling was "decent, safe and sanitary." No doubt the
federal court did not desire to spend its time deciding these factual questions, especially if state health and safety codes were to be applied in
determining the condition of the premises. Furthermore, the only defendant was the local agency. Because HUD was not a defendant,
there would be no problems of venue and service of HUD in the state
court. Perhaps, if HUD had been joined and the meaning of "decent,
safe and sanitary" had been in issue, the court would have felt differently
about refusing jurisdiction.
A compelling reason for allowing a more liberal aggregation of
claims to meet the $10,000 requirement is that many of the claims
brought under the Public Housing Act and other social welfare legislation cannot be adequately litigated and decided unless brought in
federal court. The reasons why the state court is not an adequate
forum, especially when HUD is a defendant and the issues require
a clarification of important federal policies, have been discussed
above.154 From this discussion, it is quite clear that the several other
means of obtaining federal court jurisdiction are not open to many of
In such cases,
the claims brought under the Public Housing Act.'
the $10,000 requirement should be lightly regarded.
In some cases where the loss is not suffered by any specific individual, the claim should be considered common to the class and, therefore, aggregation allowed to meet the $10,000 requirement. For example, in suits to compel citizen participation, 15 a change in admission
policies, 157 or a change in employment practices to provide tenant employment, there is no identifiable individual who can claim a specific loss.
Although these losses are difficult to ascertain, absolute certainty is
not required.' 58 The value of the loss to the plaintiffs as a result of
the defendant agency's noncompliance might be the full amount of the
program or a proportionate amount of it.' 59
154.
155.

See text accompanying notes 107-13 supra.
See text accompanying notes 119, 126-28, 133, 136-43 supra.

156.

See text accompanying notes 46-47 supra.

157. See note 17 supra.
158. See Friedman v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 220 F.2d 808, 810 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 824 (1955).
159. Cf. Pyramid Life Ins. Co. v. Masonic Hosp. Ass'n, 191 F. Supp. 51 (W.D.

Okla. 1961).
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Even in rent, repair, or relocation cases, where the individual loss is
specific and identifiable, the court might interpret that loss as one
common to, and shared by, a class of persons. This interpretation would
make sense in cases where the main issue before the court is not how
much each individual is to benefit, but what standard is to be applied
by the local agency and HUD. In such cases, the common and
shared right is the benefit or protection given each person by federal
statute or regulation, not a right in some specific repair, relocation, or
rent. In these cases, the important issue is one of federal policy, which
can best be resolved in the federal courts, and must be, if HUD is a

defendant.
Standing to Enforce Federal Housing Legislation
One possible bar to enforcement of the Housifig Act by low-income
persons is the doctrine of standing. This elusive concept has been
phrased in various ways, but essentially it is a judicially created doctrine
requiring plaintiffs to have a certain type or degree of interest in the
litigation before the court will consider the substantive issues.160 While
1 61
related to the constitutional requirement of "case or controversy,'
the requirement of standing often imposes far stricter requirements on
the capacity of persons to bring suits than does the constitutional doctrine.' 62 For instance, several older cases have held that there must be a
specific "economic" injury for plaintiffs to have standing, and that those
who sue for other reasons (e.g., philosophical, moral) have no stand160. The classic definition of "standing to sue" is found in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186 (1962): Whether the party seeking relief has "alleged such a personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." Id. at 204.
161. The judicial power of federal courts is constitutionally restricted to "cases"
and "controversies" by Article III of the United States Constitution. "Embodied in the
words 'cases' and 'controversies' are two complementary but somewhat different
limitations. In part those words limit the business of federal courts to questions presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process. [The requirement] assures the federal courts will
not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government." Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1968).
162. "Thus, a party may have standing in a particular case, but the federal court
may nevertheless decline to pass on the merits of the case because, for example, it
presents a political question. A proper party is demanded so that federal courts
will not be asked to decide 'ill-defined controversies over constitutional issues' . . . or a
case which is of 'a hypothetical or abstract character' ....
So stated, the standing
requirement is closely related to, although more general than, the rule that federal
courts will not entertain friendly suits . . . or those which are feigned or collusive in
nature. . . ." Id. at 100 (citations omitted).
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ing despite the genuineness of their objections.' 6 3 Likewise, the classic
standing case of Frothingham v. Mellon' held that where the only injury the plaintiff receives is the same as any other members of the
general public, he has no standing to sue. The effect of the doctrine
of standing is to greatly reduce the number of issues and cases the
courts will have to resolve. Because it is totally a court-created doctrine
with very flexible limits, it is natural to suspect that standing often
is used as an alternative to resolving far more difficult questions. In
effect, it is a way for courts to evade substantive questions they do not
desire, for one reason or another, to decide.
Litigation of the question of standing to enforce federal housing
legislation has focused almost entirely on the relocation provisions of the
Housing Act. Until recently, the federal courts flatly denied individuals who were to be relocated by urban renewal or other federally
assisted housing developments standing to enforce the relocation requirements of the Housing Act.
In three early cases, plaintiffs attacked the adequacy of the relocation facilities provided to dislocated persons and community residents. 6 ' They brought suit against HUD and the local redevelopment
agency under section 105(c) of the Housing Act, which specifically
requires that adequate relocation facilities be maintained or developed
for the dislocated persons of a redevelopment program. 6 6 In each case,
163. E.g., Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943).
164. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
165. Green St. Ass'n v. Daley, 373 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1967); Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency, 317 F.2d 872 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 915 (1963); HarrisonHalsted Community Group, Inc. v. HHFA, 310 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
373 U.S. 914 (1963).
See also Watts v. Housing Authority, 150 F. Supp. 552 (N.D.
Ala. 1956) (complaint dismissed for improper class action).
166. The original section 105(c), Housing Act of 1949, ch. 338, § 105, 63 Stat.
416, provided: "Contracts for financial aid shall be made only with a duly authorized
local public agency and shall require that"(c) There be a feasible method for the temporary relocation of families displaced from the project area, and that there are or are being provided, in the project
area or in other areas not generally less desirable in regard to public utilities and
public commercial facilities and at rents or prices within the financial means of the
families displaced from the project area, decent, safe and sanitary dwellings equal in
number to the number of and available to such displaced families and reasonably
accessible to their places of employment .... "
Congress has recently strengthened section 105(c). In 1964 its coverage was extended to individuals as well as families; it was further required that an assistance
program be established in order to aid the displacees. Housing Act of 1964, Pub. L.
No. 88-560, § 305, 78 Stat. 786. In 1965, subsection 105(c)(2) was added, which imposed a requirement on the Secretary to obtain assurances from the local projects
that relocation housing was available. Housing Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-117, § 305,
79 Stat. 475, 42 U.S.C. § 1455(c)(2) (Supp. III, 1968).
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the plaintiffs also alleged constitutional violations, including a claim
in one case that a group of Negro plaintiffs were being denied equal
protection of the laws by being forced to move into more segregated
areas.Y67 In each case, the court dismissed all of the claims on the
ground that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue. As the court stated in
Harrison-Halsted Community Group, Inc. v. Housing and Home Finance Agency, 06 relocation statutes do not confer private rights upon
plaintiffs, separate from their positions as members of the public. 160
Likewise, the court in Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency 70 rejected
all claims founded on the contract because there was "no indication
that Congress intended this section [105(c)] to give a right of action
to those not a party to the contract between the Redevelopment Agency
and the United States."1 ' Essentially, the courts held that the plaintiffs had not suffered the type of injury or loss of right which could be
72
treated judicially.
As a matter of simple common sense, this position is ludicrous.
A dislocated person suffers a unique and grave harm-the loss of home,
neighborhood, and even the possible loss of employment. There are statutory provisions specifically designed to insure that he at least be adequately rehoused. He alleges that these provisions are being ignored,
and the courts blithely tell him that he has no standing. What more
serious injury is possible?
The courts may well have had other, more tangible reasons for
dismissing these cases than the mechanical references to standing would
indicate. For example, the courts may have been disturbed by the possibility that they would have to review the events and policies of an
entire urban renewal program, a task involving intricate factual problems and conceivable political risks; or the courts may have been disturbed by the prospect of enjoining multimillion dollar programs, already well under way, for a considerable period of time (until adequate
relocation facilities were provided). Some of the courts hinted that
plaintiffs had other remedies. In Johnson, the court suggested that the
167.
168.
169.
170.

Green St. Ass'n v. Daley, 373 F.2d 1, 4 (7th Cir. 1967).
310 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 914 (1963).
Id. at 104.
317 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1963).

171.

Id. at 874.

172. For a general discussion of the facts in Johnson, Harrison and Green Street,
see Tondro, Urban Renewal Relocations Problems in Enforcement of Conditions on

Federal Grants to Local Agencies, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 183 (1968); Comment, Judicial
Review of Displacee Relocation in Federal Urban Renewal Projects: A New Approach?,
3 VALPARAiso U.L. REa. 258 (1969); Comment, Judicial Review of Displacee Reloca-

tion in Urban Renewal, 77 YALE L.J. 966 (1968).
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plaintiffs may not have properly availed themselves of prior administrative hearings; 173 in Green Street Association v. Haley" I and in the Harrison case, it was indicated that the plaintiffs would be afforded an
adequate remedy in the condemnation proceedings in state courts. 175
Whatever the underlying reasons for their decisions, these courts
officially based their conclusions on the plaintiffs' lack of standing to
enforce the provisions of the Housing Act. As a precedent, this meant
that poor persons would never be able to enforce, through court action,
any provision of the Housing Act. Enforcement was left completely to
administrative methods, which meant, as previously discussed, frequently
no enforcement at all. 1 76 The serious social injury resulting from inadequate relocation and the weak reasoning of these cases caused them
1 77
to be heavily criticized. '
Whether in response to such academic criticism and increased
social awareness, or for other reasons, the federal courts have recently, in three major decisions, reexamined the question of standing to enforce relocation provisions, and held that relocated persons
do have the right to challenge inadequate relocation provisions. In
Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency,' 7 8 the court reversed a lower court dismissal of an action to enjoin a redevelopment
program because of an allegedly inadequate and discriminatory application of relocation facilities to Negro families. The court expressly rejected the notion used by the lower court (and by the courts in Johnson,
Harrison and Green Street) that one must suffer the loss of a "legal
right" to obtain standing, stating:
A 'legal right' . . . in the abstract [means] nothing at all. The
specific and practical question here is whether or not plaintiff may
seek enforcement of the [relocation] section, and the cases make
it clear that the answer turns on whether
179 Congress' purpose in enacting it was to protect their interests.
The case, however, also involved serious charges of racial discrimination in the relocation of program area residents, and the opinion is not
173. 317 F.2d at 875.
174. 373 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1967).
175. The distinctions in these cases are discussed in Powelton Civic Owners
Ass'n v. HUD, 284 F. Supp. 809, 823-25 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
176. See text accompanying notes 87-93 supra.
177. Tondro, Urban Renewal Relocation: Problems in Enforcement of Conditions
on Federal Grants to Local Agencies, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 183, 208-11 (1968); Comment, Judicial Review of Displacee Relocation in Federal Urban Renewal Projects: A
New Approach?, 3 VALPARAISO U.L. REV. 258, 270-74 (1969); Comment, Judicial
Review of Displacee Relocation in Urban Renewal, 77 YALE L.J. 966, 970-76 (1968).
178. 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968).

179.

Id. at 933.
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premised solely or primarily on statutory grounds. Obviously, under
present Supreme Court cases, any discriminatory relocation or other
housing or developmental policy would give rise to an action, and hence
standing, on constitutional grounds regardless of what the result might
be on solely statutory grounds.8 0 Nevertheless, Norwalk was a groundbreaking case in that it certainly appeared to reject the simplistic "no
legal right" sophistry of earlier cases.
Another important recent case is Powelton Civic Home Owners
Association v. Department of Housing and Urban Development,'8'
where the court held that the plaintiffs, residents in a Philadelphia urban renewal area, were entitled to a hearing before the Secretary of
HUD to determine whether there were adequate relocation facilities in
the area. In holding that the plaintiffs had standing to bring suit to
compel such a hearing, the court stated:
We have concluded that the relocation provisions of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1455(c) . . . both in their substantive and in their procedural
implications, are intended for the protection of these particular
plaintiffs and do provide standing in this case. 182
Powelton, although an important and significant case, is rather
unique because the real issue was whether plaintiffs had standing to
compel the Secretary of HUD to hear their pleas; the court did not consider the plaintiffs' alternative request to review the inadequacies of the
relocation plan. A court can order the administrator to hear the dislocated persons' pleas and still not have to face (at least right away)
such fears as tying up urgent programs and vast technical problems.
By implication, however, this case authorizes standing on the part of
dislocated persons to seek judicial review; if the test for standing is the
"statutory intent to benefit," the same intent exists both for administrative and judicial action.
In the most sweeping case decided to date, Western Addition Community Organization v. Weaver (WACO), 83 the court preliminarily
enjoined a massive redevelopment program in the Western Addition section of San Francisco because the Secretary of HUD had failed to require "satisfactory assurance" that the redevelopment agency would
provide adequate relocation facilities prior to resident displacement.
The plaintiffs were members of a community organization composed of
individuals who would lose their existing housing under the relocation
180.
infra.
181.
182.
183.

Cf. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); see text accompanying notes 194-95
284 F. Supp. 809 (1968).
Id. at 825.
294 F. Supp. 433 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
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plan. In holding that they had standing to seek judicial review of the
actions (or inactions) of the Secretary of HUD, the court stated the
following:
[Standing] arises out of a manifest intent of Congress to protect
the interest of a particular class-individuals and families about to
be displaced by the urban renewal project. .

.

.

[Wlhen a stat-

ute clearly reflects a Congressional purpose to protect the interests
of a particular class, persons within
1 84 that class have standing to
require compliance with the statute.
It, unfortunately, would be easy to overestimate the importance
of these three cases. While they are undoubtedly a great advance over
the insistence of previous courts that Congress must say in so many
words that dislocated persons had a right to seek court review, their
practical, as opposed to their scholarly, impact is far from clear. First,
and most important, the cases only allow plaintiffs to get into court.
What little they have to say (primarily in WACO) on the scope of judicial review or the remedies permissible is not particularly encouraging for those concerned with achieving a significant improvement in
low-income housing. The cases did clearly distinguish, as earlier
cases did not, between questions of standing (the plaintiffs' interest in
the litigation) and justiciability (the amenability of the problem to judicial resolution). 85 It is possible that this doctrinal clarification will
justifiably help to narrow the restraint imposed by the standing requirement; however, it may lead to new restraints under the doctrine of
justicability, to be discussed below, 8 6 such as the court's lack of "expertise" to review HUD's actions.
Moreover, there are several special circumstances in the relocation cases which may limit their usefulness to the particular problems
of displacement. First, it is obvious that past relocation policies have
been disastrous. 18 7 The failures of relocation have been criticized by
many authors."8 8 Federal courts were surely aware of the social problems of relocation (or nonrelocation) if not in 1958, then in 1968. Because of these many years of obvious failure, they were less inclined to
leave this problem solely to the administrators. Second, the congressional intent to protect relocated persons was, as the WACO court
184. Id. at 443.
185. For a general discussion of "justiciable" as compared with "standing," see
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-101 (1968).
186. See text accompanying notes 229-33 infra.
187. See text accompanying notes 5-10 supra.
188. E.g., D. THURSZ, WHERE ARE THEY Now? 5 (1966); Millspaugh, Problems
and Opportunities of Relocation, 26 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 6 (1961).
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stated, clearly reflected in the statutory language.' 8 9 Indeed, in 1965,
Congress specifically amended the relocation provisions to provide for
greater protection for relocation residents by requiring the Secretary's
approval of the local relocation plan. 9 ' Possibly, even greater evidence
of congressional concern over the problem was the increased appropriations available for construction of low-income housing for relocation
purposes.: 9 ' In light of this rather overwhelming congressional concern, it may well be that all the courts did was apply the standard test
found in the law of torts. Traditionally, the courts have upheld actions
(in essence, the same thing as "standing") by private parties where a
statute, designed to protect them as a class from the particular harm
that caused their injury, is violated.' 9 2 The "intent to benefit" test of
standing has also been traditionally applied to determine standing in
other cases involving clear statutory intent to protect or benefit a cer-

tain class of persons."93
Unfortunately, the many other beneficial statutes and regulations
arising under the Public Housing Act that impose requirements of repair, architectural design, and citizen participation, are far less explicit
in their intent to benefit a certain defined class. They benefit all residents of low-income housing, and for that matter, quite clearly benefit
189. 294 F. Supp. at 443.
190. 42 U.S.C. § 1451(c) (Supp. IV, 1969).
191. See 42 U.S.C. § 1465 (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1465 (Supp. III,
1968).
192. See, e.g., Richards v. Stanley, 43 Cal. 2d 60, 271 P.2d 23 (1954); Nunneley
v. Edgar Hotel, 36 Cal. 2d 493, 225 P.2d 497 (1950); Miglierini v. Havemann, 240
Cal. App. 2d 570, 49 Cal. Rptr. 795 (1966). See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THa LAW OF TORTS § 35 (3d ed. 1964).
193. See Shanks Village Comm. v. Cary, 197 F.2d 212 (2d Cir. 1952), where a
class of tenant veterans brought suit against the Public Housing Administration to enjoin enforcement of a 15 percent rent increase on the grounds that the increase violated
a requirement of the Lanham Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1571 (1964), that rent be within the
financial reach of servicemen with families. The court held that the tenants had
standing to sue because the clear purpose of the statute was to protect the class from
excessive rents.
In Merge v. Sharott, 341 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1965), businessmen sought a declaration of their rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1456 (1964), as amended (Supp. II1, 1968),
to receive full payment for the cost of removal of their business from a redevelopment
area. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs were among the class of persons whom
Congress intended to compensate in order to mitigate their hardships and that they
were clearly covered by the wording of the statute; thus, they had standing to sue.
For additional cases allowing standing to sue where the plaintiff is a member of a
class of persons protected by a statute see Chicago v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R.,
357 U.S. 77, 83 (1958); J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1946); Stark v.
Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 309 (1944); Gart v. Cole, 262 F.2d 244 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 978 (1959).
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society in general. Attractive architecture rewards the surrounding
neighborhood more than those who live inside the buildings.
Nonetheless, there is no reason for narrowly limiting the arguments
in the cases to instances of express congressional intent. The fundamental question is what is the congressional purpose, and does it further that purpose to allow the plaintiffs (here limited to low-income persons in need of decent, low-rental housing) the right to bring suit to
enforce federal legislation. Dealing with this problem requires an examination of the policies behind housing programs, and a reexamination
of the role of the administrative processes in enforcing these programs.
Federal courts in other areas have begun to recognize that the effectuation of congressional purposes requires a broadened standard of
"standing"; they realize that there must be a liberalization of how one
must be affected by violations of federal statutes in order to obtain
"standing," and who, therefore, has the right to effectuate administrative
and congressional policy. In Office of Communication of United
Church of Christ v. Federal Communications Commission, the court
held that members of a television audience had standing to intervene in
an FCC license renewal hearing of a particular television station. The
court stated that "unless the listeners-the broadcast consumers-can
be heard, there may be no one to bring programming deficiencies or
offensive overcommercialization to the attention of the Commission in
an effective manner."19 5 By a process of elimination, those "consumers" willing to shoulder the burdensome and costly processes of
intervention in a commission proceeding are likely to be the only ones
having a "sufficient" interest to challenge a renewal application.
Likewise, in Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Fedcral
Power Commission,"' the court recognized the importance of allowing
groups representing public concerns (as opposed to private commercial
interests) to intervene in a Federal Power Commission hearing on the
granting of a license to build a power plant. The Federal Power Act
contains provisions recognizing the public interest in preserving aesthetic, recreational and conservational values. The court held that where
a group obviously represents those values, it has a right to be heard by
19 7
the administrator.
194.
195.
(1940).

359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
Id. at 1004-05; accord, FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470

196.

354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).

197.

Accord, Road Review League v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967),
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In substance, the cases recognize that to whom an administrator
listens will probably determine how he acts. If only business interests or
local housing agencies are heard, theirs will probably be the only interests considered.
Unfortunately, there is little factual indication that broadening the
requirement of standing will have any substantial effect on the administrative process. Administrators cannot be neutral arbitrators. Consciously or otherwise, they come to feel they have a certain social role to
play. Listening to opposing views may merely be an illusion of increased
Specifparticipation in the administrative process, with no reality.'
ically, in the housing area, the same social and politial pressures weighing on the local administrators and HUD will exist even if low-income
residents have a greater chance to be heard in the early stages of the
administrative process. The importance of Scenic Hudson and United
Church of Christ is not simply that they permit participation in administrative hearings, but that they indicate that the courts are moving
toward a more functional definition of standing by assuring that some
members of the public can require adequate effectuation of public
policies. Within the limits imposed by the Constitntion (the requirements of a "case or controversy"), the question of standing then revolves
around what types of interests are affected and, most importantly, who
are the litigants who can enforce those interests. The question is not
whether Congress specifically intended to benefit "X" class of low-income residents by requiring, for instance, citizen participation in planning for low-income housing; the question is, if low-income residents
cannot seek to have this right enforced, who else can.
Thus, the question in housing cases becomes similar to the problem
resolved by the Supreme Court in Flast v. Cohen.'99 In that case, a
federal taxpayer was granted standing to challenge the constitutionality
of a federal statute providing federal funds to parochial schools,
allegedly in violation of the establishment and free exercise of religion
clause of the first amendment. Since those persons who benefited directly from the expenditure of these funds were obviously not going to
where the court, following Scenic Hudson, granted standing to sue to property owners
and a nonprofit organization especially concerned with conservational desirability of
highway routes in an action against the Federal Highway Administrator to review his
allegedly arbitrary choice of alternate highway routes.

198. For a criticism of the effectiveness of hearings see C. ABRAMs, THE CITY Is
THE FRONTIER 140-45 (1965); Comment, Judicial Review of Displacee Relocation in
Federal Urban Renewal Projects: A New Approach?, 3 VALPARAISO U.L. REV. 258,
265-66 (1969).
199. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
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question the statute's constitutionality, no one else but the taxpayer
would be likely to bring suit. A refusal to allow the taxpayer to bring
suit would, in this instance, have rendered nugatory the protections of
the first amendment.
The analogy to the housing area is clear. Without allowing the
low-income persons affected by our housing and redevelopment programs to bring suit, the basic goals of the Housing Act could be entirely
frustrated. In these recent cases, the public agencies responsible for
administering public policy clearly have not been considered by the
courts as the sole and adequate guardians of the public interest." ° The
only way plaintiffs affected by HUD programs can assure enforcement
of the public policies underlying housing legislation is through the courts.
Any problems encountered by the administrative agency from allowing
suits by parties affected by these programs are offset by the benefits of
giving these individuals an effective means of reaching their government
and thereby keeping intact the vital policies underlying housing legislation. In addition, such suits might well make administrative agencies
more responsive to, and representative of, the public.
Given these considerations, the courts should be amenable to granting standing to low-income persons seeking the benefits or protections
provided under the Housing Act; the public policy which they seek to
enforce would, in all probability, not be effectuated if they were not
granted standing to sue. There is no one more affected by, or interested
in, the enforcement of those provisions than the low-income persons
who are intended to benefit from them. Moreover, the social and welfare policies that they seek to enforce are often opposed by a majority
in their community. A clear purpose of our judicial system is to safeguard the rights of the minority and protect their interests from abuse
by the majority.
The real impact of the recent relocation cases may be found in
their recognition that there is no one else to enforce federal legislation
but the low-income residents. The court in Powelton stated:
If the public interest in these values [proper relocation] is to be
protected, the voices of those most dramatically affected by dis200. Cf. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d
994 (1966). "The theory that the Commission can always effectively represent the
listener interests in a renewal proceeding without the aid and participation of legitimate
listener representatives fulfilling the role of private attorneys general is one of those
assumptions we collectively try to work with so long as they are reasonably adequate.
When it becomes clear . . . that it is no longer a valid assumption which stands up
under the realities of actual experience, neither we nor the Commission can rely on it."
Id. at 1003-04.
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regard of the values must be heard. If the residents in the project
site have no standing to raise these issues "in the public interest,"
then, for all practical purposes, no one has standing, and the
Secretary's determinations
would be virtually immune from ju201
dicial review.
Adoption of the "who else" test would mean that certain lowincome persons would have standing to seek enforcement of almost all
substantive policies affecting public housing and redevelopment. Of
course, this would not include the enforcement of internal administrative regulations, which do not have a substantial or direct effect on
low-income persons. 20 2 The enforcement of such regulations would be
properly left to the domain of the agencies. Nor would this mean that,
all low-income persons would have the right to bring suit to enforce
provisions of the Public Housing Act. Only those low-income persons
who are most affected and thus most likely, practically speaking, to
bring suit would obtain standing. This would assure both compliance
with the "case or controversy" clause and complete litigation of the case.
Persons not a party to the litigation, therefore, would not be unfairly
precluded by res judicata from raising the same question.
Cries of flooding the courts' dockets with thousands of lawsuits are inevitably made by those opposed to a liberalization of the requirement of standing. 2 3 The cries deserve no sympathy. It is no excuse to close the court's doors to genuine lawsuits because of the fear
that the courts might become too crowded. That such fear is often unfounded was noted by the courts in Scenic Hudson and United Church
of Christ, each of which emphasized that its liberalized concept of
"standing" would not really expose the agencies to "thousands" of lawsuits. The courts pointed out that the expense and vexation of legal
proceedings is not lightly undertaken.
Once the courts recognize that the only purpose of standing is to
assure the "concreteness of interest" that makes the adversary system
work, certain traditional shibboleths concerning the types of interests
necessary for standing lose their importance. One such shibboleth
is that one must suffer the loss of some economic or fundamental
right to obtain standing. 0 4 In the recent relocation cases of WACO,
Powelton, and Norwalk, the threatened loss was drastic, although not
necessarily classified as economic in traditional terms. In many other
instances, the economic loss is much less clear, and may be suffered in
201. Powelton Civic Home Owners Ass'n v. HUD, 284 F. Sup?. 809, 827 (1968).
202. See notes 244-45 & accompanying text infra.
203. See note 142 supra.
204. See, e.g., Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943).
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common with many others. For example, where there is no community participation in the planning process or in the management of a
housing program, the loss is suffered by many without a precise determination of the injury in monetary terms. What is clear is that the program is not working as Congress originally intended.
It is apparent that neither economic injury nor the loss of a specific individual legal right is a necessary adjunct to standing. In
Scenic Hudson, neither physical harm nor loss of any particular recognized rights was suffered by the plaintiffs.20 5 In Flast, the Court granted
standing to the plaintiff-taxpayers even though the actual economic harm
they suffered was minimal and no different from that suffered by other
federal taxpayers. °6
The suggested approach toward standing also eliminates the "tail
wags dog" approach of trying to determine whether a plaintiff has
suffered a "legal wrong." As to reviewing a HUD decision under the
APA, the statute provides as follows:
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning
of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.20 7
Generally, this APA section has not been construed as creating
independent legal rights. 208 Thus, the notion of whether a person has
suffered a legal wrong has depended on the courts' own interpretation,
or on the interpretation of previous cases, of what constitutes a "legal
wrong." Past cases, such as Harrison, have stated that one suffers no
legal wrong unless he loses a statutory right that Congress states is
subject to review. 20 9 Rather than try to indulge in metaphysical speculation on what a legal wrong is, or seek to determine whether Congress
precisely defined the loss as a legal wrong, all the court has to do is
determine whether, in terms of the statutory purpose and common sense
realities, a wrong has been alleged. Residents of a low-income housing
project, for example, are obviously wronged by a denial of participa210
tion in the management and decision-making affecting their welfare.
Because the statute requiring citizen participation was obviously enacted
to protect or benefit persons such as them, they have "standing" to en205. See text accompanying notes 196-97 supra.
206. See text accompanying note 199 supra.
207. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. II, 1967).
208. See, e.g., Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924, 931-32
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955).
209. Harrison-Halsted Community Group, Inc. v. HHFA, 310 F.2d 99, 104 (7th
Cir. 1962); see 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE TREATISE § 22.04, at 221-23 (1958).
210. Such participation is required by HUD. See text accompanying notes 46-47
supra.
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force participation rights. In Scenic Hudson, Powelton, and Road
Review League v. Boyd,21 ' the courts indicated that one is "adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute" if they have alleged the denial of a benefit or protection of the
statute which they seek to enforce. This interpretation of the APA
makes good sense and is consistent with 21the
suggested approach for
2
standing to enforce the Public Housing Act.
It should be further noted that the suggested approach for standing to sue under the statutory claim arising under the Housing Act
should also be applied to the contractual claims based on the funding
contract between the local agency and HUD. In both WACO and
Norwalk the court held that the plaintiffs had standing to bring their
contractual claims as third party beneficiaries of the loan and capital
grant which incorporated the statutory relocation provisions of the
Housing Act into the contract.21 In Norwalk, the court made clear its
intention to treat the contractual duties placed on the redevelopment
agency similar to duties created by direct regulation:
That Congress provided for enforcement of the relocation provisions
through contracts with the local agencies does not weaken the
appropriateness of judicial review, for such a method of enforcement is natural where Congress is specifying what requirements
local agencies must meet in order to receive federal aid. The
possibility that an administrative agency, charged with enforcing
a requirement established by Congress in the public interest, will
not adequately perform tbe task is equally great whether enforcement is through contract or through direct regulation. Accordingly, the reasons for allowing those who have a direct, personal interest in furthering the Congressional purpose to seek ju211. 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
212. See generally Note, Judicial Review of Displacee Relocation in Urban Renewal, 77 YALE L.J. 966, 971-76 (1968).
213. Cf. Schnell v. Schmidt, 126 Cal. App. 2d 279, 272 P.2d 82 (1954), where a
group of veterans brought suit against a contractor from whom they had purchased
homes, alleging that the contractor had failed to comply with government specifications
set forth in a contract with the government and made pursuant to the Veterans Emergency Housing Act of 1946, ch. 268, 60 Stat. 207. The court held that the class of
plaintiffs had standing to sue as third party beneficiaries, even though the government was a contracting party, because the contractual requirements were intended to
protect the class of persons to which the plaintiffs belonged. Id. at 290-91, 272 P.2d
at 89-90.
There had been a line of cases denying standing to beneficiaries seeking enforcement of government contracts. E.g., Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay,
225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955). However, the Supreme
Court in Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1968) has made it clear that
when a statute clearly reflects a congressional purpose to protect interests of a particular class, persons within that class have standing to require compliance with the
statute.
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dicial review of administrative
action are as compelling in one situ21 4
ation as in the other.

As a practical matter, there may be no compelling reason to bring
the contractual claim along with the statutory claim since they are
almost always identical. Even when the relief requested is to enjoin
further funding under the contract, the injunction could be based on the
statutory claim rather than the contractual claim. On the other hand,
if the contractual claim is alleged, there would be no reason for the
court to reach a different result in its determination of standing since the
claims are essentially identical.2 15
The Right to Review
Assuming that a plaintiff can obtain jurisdiction and standing to
sue, the difficult questions remaining are whether the courts will review the action, and if they do review it, how extensive the review will
be. Rather than looking to the status of the particular plaintiff to determine standing, the question of review (or justiciability) is determined by
looking to the issue in controversy and deciding whether the court has
the power and expertise to review it. These questions are particularly
important for issues arising under the Public Housing Act because most
of the statutes restricting or defining agency actions are broadly framed
and discretionary, thereby making them more difficult to review.
Agency Action Committed by Law to Agency Discretion

Section 701(a)(2) of the APA states that judicial review shall
not be available where the "agency action is committed to agency discretion by law."2
The Public Housing Act is replete with laws that in
214. Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 934 (2d Cir. 1968).
215. It should be noted that section 510(B), pt. II, of the annual contributions
contract appears to cut off any third party's standing to sue as a beneficiary of the
contract. Under the heading "Rights of Third Parties," section 510(B) states: "Nothing in this contract shall be construed as creating or justifying any claim against the
FHA by any third party other than as provided in subsection (A) of this sec. 510."
However, section 510(A) speaks only of the right of third party holders "of the funds
and of interest claims thereunder" to "enforce performance by the FHA of its obligations to pay the annual contributions pledged as security for such funds and interest pursuant to this contract . . . by action at law or suit in equity." Thus section
510(B) must be read as limiting only money claims by third parties. It should also
be noted that federal law, not state law, is applied to determine the rights of third
party beneficiaries to enforce provisions of the annual contributions contract. Johnson
v. Redevelopment Agency, 317 F.2d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 1963). It is clearly desirable
that the rights of persons to enforce contractual provisions be uniform throughout the
states.
216. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (Supp.II,1967).
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effect commit broad discretion to agency action. The statutes and
regulations governing HUD and the local agencies are broadly framed
to allow for numerous local variances of a social, political and economic
nature, for experimentation in new programs and for flexible arrangements between the public and private sectors. Thus, if this APA section were literally applied, most of the local agency actions, and actions
of HUD in granting approval or disapproval of the local actions, would
be unreviewable.
Relying upon this APA provision, the Secretary of HUD contended
in the WACO case that the court could not review his discretionary
determination that the local agency's relocation plan was "satisfactory. ' 21 7 The court held that the delegation of discretion by itself was
not sufficient to make the Secretary's determination unreviewable 18
There was no congressional intent, the court pointed out, to give the
Secretary absolute discretion in reviewing the local agency's relocation
plan. The local agency's plan must be "satisfactory"-a standard set
2 19
by Congress in limiting the Secretary's discretion.
The court in WACO relied upon another APA section that expressly authorizes the court to set aside any administrative decision constituting an abuse of discretion. 20 Review of alleged abuses of administrative discretion, the court noted, was in keeping with the traditional role of the court "of defining and maintaining the proper
bounds of administrative discretion and safeguarding the rights of the
individual.'
It is now established that "only upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence of a contrary legislative intent should the court restrict access to judicial review." 222 Furthermore, the APA provides
that judicial review of final agency action is limited only "to the extent
that . . . statutes preclude judicial review ....
"223
Thus, the mere
217. Western Addition Community Organization v. Weaver, 294 F. Supp. 433,
442 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
218. Id.
219. "If Congress had intended to completely immunize the Secretary from judicial review concerning the proper exercise of this discretion, it could easily have
said so as it did in section 1465(e), which, dealing with the amount of relocation
assistance payments to individuals and families, provides that determination of such
amount by the Secretary 'shall be final and conclusive for any purposes and not subject
to redetermination by any court or any other office.'" 294 F. Supp. at 442 n.4.
220. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (Supp. H1, 1967).
221. 294 F. Supp. at 445, quoting Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 356 F.2d 1, 5-6
(2d Cir. 1966).
222. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967).
223. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (Supp. II, 1967).
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delegation of discretion to the agency by Congress is not sufficient to
demonstrate a congressional intent that agency determination made by
24
such discretion is not reviewable.1
There are no provisions of the Public Housing Act which show by
clear and convincing evidence that Congress intended to preclude judicial review of the discretionary statutes under the Act. As noted in
both WACO 225 and Norwalk,221 since the Public Housing Act was intended to benefit persons in need of decent housing, the Act actually
invites review. There are specific provisions, however, clearly precluding review of certain issues. For example. review of the amounts of
money awarded by the Secretary of HUD to families for purposes of
relocation is expressly precluded. 27 One may infer, as the court did in
WACO, that the presence of provisions expressly precluding a review of
specific issues indicates an intent of Congress not to preclude review of
other issues. 2
Expertise
Courts sometimes refuse review on the ground that they lack the
necessary expertise to consider complex and technical issues such as
might arise in the housing and redevelopment areas. In Johnson,229
the court rationalized that because of the complexitiy of urban renewal
and the expertise of the Secretary of HUD, Congress delegated the sole
power and duty of enforcing the conditions of the loan and capital
230
grant contract to the Secretary.
It is submitted that a refusal by the court to review issues arising
under the Housing Act because of its lack of expertise is wholly unjustified. Courts daily review issues clearly as complex and difficult as
those which might arise under the Housing Act. Antitrust, patent, and
school segregation cases often involve complex factual questions. In
cases involving other administrative procedures, courts have likewise
acted. In Road Review League v. Boyd, 23 1 the court reviewed an ac224. See generally Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Commited to Agency Discretion," 82 HARV. L. REv. 367 (1968): "[T]he existence of broad
discretion is not alone sufficient to bar review; there is no such thing as 'absolute' discretion, a discretion so broad as to make abuse literally inconceivable." Id. at 382.
See note 219 supra.
225. 294 F. Supp. at 443-44.
226. 395 F.2d at 933-34.
227. 42 U.S.C. § 1465(e) (Supp. III, 1968).
228. See note 219 supra.
229. Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency, 317 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1963).
230. Id. at 874.
231. 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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tion challenging an approval of a highway route by the Federal Highway Administration. The court considered all evidence relevant to the
choice between two alternative highway routes in light of engineering
problems, local planning needs, and the impact of the road upon natural resources and beauty. In Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference
v. Federal Power Commission,232 the court reviewed similar complex
issues dealing with the approval of the Federal Power Commission to
grant a license to construct a storage hydroelectric project in a conservation area.
The court need not possess an expertise necessary to reach the
"right" planning or technical decision. The important role of the
court is to keep the administration within proper legal bounds, a role
traditionally played by American courts.2 33 Compared with the administrative agency, the courts have much greater expertise to decide
what the proper bounds of discretion are. Furthermore, it can consider
both the evidence and the relevant laws and regulations in a more
independent manner than the administrative agency. Finally, the severe lack of expertise of many local agency decision makers, especially
the inexperienced members of the local agency governing boards
(housewives, priests, and political patrons), should not be forgotten.
Sovereign Immunity
Never ready to give up, the Secretary of HUD in the Powelton case
contended that the court could not review the action because it was not
consented to by the United States and therefore was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The court found no merit in the argument
for various reasons. First, to the extent the Administrative Procedure
Act was applicable, it established a presumption of the right to review
which implies a waiver of the sovereign immunity against federal officers.2 34 Second, the provision of the Public Housing Act stating that
the administrator may "sue and be sued ' 23 5 effectively waived the defense of sovereign immunity.23 6 Third, where the Secretary exceeds
his statutory authority, he loses his sovereign immunity by ceasing to
act as a governmental official.237 No doubt, the court considered the
doctrine of sovereign immunity to be an historical tradition with little
232.

354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).

233.

See text accompanying notes 220-21 supra.

234.

284 F. Supp. at 834.

235.
236.

42 U.S.C. § 1456(c) (Supp. IV, 1969).
See Powelton Civic Home Owners Ass'n v. HUD, 284 F. Supp. 809, 834

(1968).
237.

See id. at 834-35.
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relevance to the Secretary of HUD and matters of housing.23 8
Remedy and Timing of the Suit
A major reason for the failure of many of the relocation cases and
other cases arising under the Housing Act has been the lack of an
adequate remedy. The usual remedy requested in these cases is to
enjoin the agency from carrying on its program until the statutory violations complained of are corrected. Clearly, courts dislike this remedy
since, as stated in WACO, it may do more harm than good.23 9 Quite
probably, the drastic impact of a cessation in the redevelopment program was an underlying reason for the courts in Johnson, Harrison,
and Green Street, refusing to hear the merits of these cases.24 °
Although drastic, the remedy of cutting off funds to a program,
or at least stopping that part of a program causing the harm, can serve
a real function. The threat of this remedy is perhaps the only effective
means that will induce agencies to eliminate major violations. Furthermore, the great harm and cost suffered by relocated persons in the
past clearly suggests that our redevelopment programs should be halted
until the social cost borne by the dislocated person is removed.
Of course, the timing of a suit requesting that funds be cut off is
crucial. Because of the number of commitments and contracts entered
into, delay in bringing suit will maximize the potential harm of injunctive
relief. If the suit is brought at the early planning stage, then the harm
is minimized, although the expense of delay by itself may be costly to the
agency. For this reason, declaratory judgment suits could be a useful
vehicle to raise federal issues at an early stage in a development process.
Declaratory judgment suits, however, require "final" agency action. 24 '
By the time HUD action is final, several years may have passed and immediate injunctive relief may be needed. Hence, plaintiffs should argue
that HUD approval of an initial planning grant is "final" in the factual
sense that it serves to commit the agencies.
If the statutory violations are not substantial and if the lawsuit
is brought after commitments have been made, then it would be desirable
to seek a remedy other than cutting off funds. One such remedy is the
238. See generally Cahn & Cahn, The New Sovereign Immunity, 81 HnAv. L.
REV. 926 (1968); Kramer, The Place and Function of Judicial Review in the Administrative Process, 28 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1959).
239. Memorandum of Decision on Defendant's Motion to Dissolve Preliminary
Injunction, Western Addition Community Organization v. Romney, No. 49053, at
9-10 (N.D. Cal., Mar. 5, 1969).
240. See text accompanying notes 168-78 supra.
241. Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 246-47 (1952).
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use of the court's contempt power. In Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing
Authority,242 the court found that the local housing authority had racially discriminated in the placement of its tenants and in the selection of
its sites. The court noted that to cut off the funds for construction of
further housing would do more harm than good for the plaintiffs. Instead, the court issued a mandatory injunction compelling the agency
to undertake immediate steps to improve its selection of sites and placement of tenants. Such a remedy could also be used in relocation cases
by requiring that the agency take all immediate and necessary steps to
assure adequate relocation of each family.
The effectiveness of the mandatory injunction is limited in that it
depends solely upon the contempt power of the court. If an agency does
not comply, it is rare for a court to place the responsible person of that
agency in jail. Public agencies, however, because they are public, may
respond to a dictate of the court regardless of the consequences of noncompliance.
Except in the racial discrimination cases, courts tend to avoid issuing injunctions compelling public agencies to follow a detailed plan of
action. The reason for this reluctance is that the courts do not want to
become involved in social planning and generally lack the necessary
expertise. For example, courts cannot or will not specifically determine
what type of citizen participation is required by housing and redevelopment agencies, or what type of rent schedule or admission policies housing authorities should have. Accordingly, the plaintiff may seek declaratory relief to establish that a practice violates the Act and an injunction to prohibit its use. If the agency does not then adopt an adequate
alternative, the plaintiff may again take evidence before the court to
show noncompliance and to request a narrower court order. Alternatively, the plaintiff might request sufficient time to draw up an appropriate plan and submit it to the court for approval. This was done in
Gautreaux.
Scope of Review
The struggle to obtain jurisdiction, standing, and the right to review by the courts is of no avail if the extent or scope of review is very
limited. Without some substantial review of the agency action, there
is no meaningful check by the courts on abuse of agency discretion. 243
242. 296 F. Supp. 907, 914 (N.D. Ill. 1969). A further order was entered in this
case on July 1, 1969, prohibiting further construction of public housing in predominantly Negro areas and requiring desegregation of predominantly white housing projects.
OEO Pov. L. RnP. 1 10,010.
243. The APA requires the court to review the entire record of the action. 5
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The extent to which the court weighs the facts (as opposed
to interpreting the questions of law) in reviewing an agency determination is basically dependent upon the nature of the agency decision or action. If the agency is involved in a decision requiring factual findings
on the particular status of an individual, then the procedure is deemed
to be adjudicatory,2 44 and the court, upon review, will require that the
agency decision be supported by substantial evidence. On the other
hand, if the agency's decision is based more on an evaluation of factors
not uniquely related to any specific individual but to a group of persons,
then the agency is involved in legislative factfinding and the court, 245
upon review, will only require that the agency decision not be arbi246
trary.
There is clearly a difference between the "substantial evidence" test
for review of adjudicative facts, and the "arbitrariness" test for review
of legislative facts. Under the "arbitrariness" test, the agency need
only show some reasonable basis for its action or decision.24 7 Under
the "substantial evidence" test, however, the courts looks into the probative value of the evidence before it, and requires not only that the
agency decision be reasonable, but also that it be supported by substantial evidence.248
It is quite clear that the court would use the "substantial evidence"
rule in reviewing such matters as evictions and, possibly, denial of admissions. These issues deal with facts relating to individual determinaU.S.C. § 706(1)(E) (Supp. III, 1968). Upon reviewing issues arising under the
Housing Act, however, the court is rarely, if ever, presented with a complete record,
since there is usually no administrative hearing procedure through which a complete
record might be compiled.
The court can remedy this problem in various ways: by taking evidence itself, or
by appointing a master to compile a hearing on the record. In a few cases, the
court has compiled the record itself. For example, in Western Addition Community
Organization v. Weaver, the court received evidence and numerous documents from
both parties.
244. "Adjudicative facts are the facts about the parties and their activities,
businesses, and properties. Adjudicative facts usually answer the questions of who did
what, where, when, how, why, with what motive or intent; adjudicative facts are roughly
the kind of facts that go to a jury in a jury case." 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 7.02, at 413 (1958).
245. "Legislative facts do not usually concern the immediate parties but are general
facts which help the tribunal decide questions of law and policy and discretion." Id.
246. See Powelton Civic Home Owners Ass'n v. HUD, 284 F. Supp. 809, 829-32
(E.D. Pa. 1968).
247. See id. at 831.
248. See, e.g., In re New York Water Serv. Corp., 283 N.Y. 23, 27 N.E.2d 221
(1940).
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tions.249
The scope of review for other determinations arising under the
Housing Act are not nearly so clear. For example, an agency action
providing for relocation facilities for displaced individuals requires a
general analysis of both the housing supply and the planning for a
group of persons. But the agency must plan for the specific needs of
the displaced persons, and the failure to adequately relocate is felt dramatically by the individual.
In Powelton and Gart, in determining whether aggrieved relocatees
were entitled to an adjudicative or legislative hearing, the courts stated
that the agency decisions pertaining to relocation were decisions involving "legislative" factfinding, since most of the facts required were general statistical facts relating to the housing supply and to groups of people.250 The courts stated that the crucial factor in the legislative-adjudicative distinction is the nature of the inquiry for making the decision,
not whether the impact of the decision is felt individually.
The distinction between "legislative" and "adjudicative" facts, however, is not nearly so clear. For example, the inquiry and fact-gathering
in relocation planning must be made to meet the needs of the specific
displaced individual. Furthermore, the decisionmaking on relocation
is not nearly so policy oriented as most decisions cited in the APA
as examples of rule making.2 51
In WACO, the court appeared to be using a "substantial evidence"
test when reviewing the facts relating to the Secretary's approval of a
plan for relocation facilities. Upon granting the preliminary injunction,
the court stated that the Secretary's discretion concerning the satisfactoriness of the local redevelopment agency's relocation plan would not be
subject to review to the extent it has been exercised "not arbitrarily, but
252
reasonably with some substantial and supporting factual basis.1
Only four months later, however, the court in WACO, upon dissolving the preliminary injunction and dismissing the complaint, appeared to be using the "arbitrariness" test. At that time, the court
stated that "the court cannot go so far as to hold that the Secretary's
249. The APA does not require the use of the "substantial evidence" test for individual determinations made by the local housing authority, since it is not a federal
agency governed by the APA.
250. Gart v. Cole, 263 F.2d 244, 250-51 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 978
(1959); Powelton Civic Home Owners Ass'n v. HUD. 284 F. Supp. 809, 829 (E.D.
Pa. 1968).
251. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (Supp. 11, 1967).

252. Western Addition Community Organization v. Weaver, 294 F. Supp. 433, 443
(N.D. Cal. 1968).
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exercise of his statutory function, primary responsibility and sound
253
discretion is wholly arbitrary, irresponsible and without factual basis.

One reason for this "about face" by the court was that the Secretary
had suddenly changed his position from a conditional approval of the
local agency's relocation plan to a full approval. That reversal by itself might be explained as the basis of the court's decision, but the
court seems to have required more than just a paper approval by the
Secretary-the court did look into the evidence supporting the Secretary's approval and concluded that it had some reasonable basis. More
important, the practical circumstances in WACO pressed the court to
adopt a narrower test for its scope of review at the time of dismissal.
The court mentioned that further restraint of the redevelopment program might do more harm to those who were to benefit from the program than good to the displaced persons.2 54 Nonetheless, the court appears to have approached the scope of review problem on a more functional basis than to merely bind itself to a certain scope of review that is
predicated on a mechanical determination that the agency decision was
legislative rather than adjudicative.
Whether the determinations are classified as legislative or adjudicative, the public agency cannot make decisions without considering all
viewpoints. In Powelton, the court held that it was violative of due process for the Secretary of HUD not to consider viewpoints and evidence
other than those submitted by the local agency. Logically, it would seem
that due process would also require that the agency decision be reasonable and supported by some evidence. Otherwise, if any decision can be
made which conceivably is reasonable, then the requirement that alternative viewpoints and evidence be considered is meaningless.
The crucial factor in WACO, and the crucial factor in most determinations involving broadly worded statutes or regulations, is how the
court construed the broadly worded regulation at issue. The crucial
factor was not whether the court applied the "arbitrariness" or "substantial evidence" test in reviewing the facts. If the court interprets
"satisfactory assurance" to mean that the Secretary need only require
some basis for assuring the provision of relocation facilities as the
WACO court seems to have done, then it is difficult for the dislocated
person to prevail even with review under the "substantial evidence"
test. However, if "satisfactory assurance" were construed to mean that
253.
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the Secretary must require from the local agency reliable evidence and
assurance that each dislocated person will be relocated into a dwelling
that is not only safe and sanitary but also not higher in rent,255 then
it is not very difficult to show that the Secretary's approval was arbitrary.
The requirement that housing supplied under the Housing Act
must be "decent, safe, and sanitary" 256 is another situation where the
court's interpretation of statutory language is important. "Decent, safe
and sanitary" could mean compliance with the local safety and health
codes or it could merely designate a condition not threatening the
health, safety and welfare of the inhabitants. Under the former construction, it would not be hard in many cases to show noncompliance
even by use of the "arbitrariness" test, but under the latter construction
it would be difficult to show that conditions such as broken windows,
doors, exposed but removed wiring, or even loose plaster would be
imminently threatening even by use of the "substantial evidence" test.
Another example is the requirement of citizen participation in all
HUD-assisted programs.2 57 "Citizen participation" might require local
agencies to involve citizens to the maximum extent feasible in planning,
programming, and execution, without substantially hindering the program's effectiveness. Alternatively, it might only require the involvement of some citizens, handpicked by the mayor, in an advisory capacity. Many programs could be proved to be in noncompliance under the former construction even under the "arbitrariness" test, but it
would be difficult to show noncompliance of most programs under the
latter construction even with use of the "substantial evidence" test.
A final example is the requirement that rents be set within the financial reach of the low-income families in the community with consideration being given to the efficiency and solvency of the local housing authority.25 This provision might require that the local housing
authority, without becoming insolvent and inefficient, set rents as low
as possible, adopt rent schedules in accordance with the families' rentpaying ability (i.e., within the housing allotments for welfare families),
and apply for grants to improve its financial and physical condition
before reaching into the tenants' pockets, or it might only require that
the local housing authority not increase rents if it begins to make a profit
rather than utilizing the money for repairs or a reserve fund. Under the
255. 42 U.S.C. § 1402 (Supp. IV, 1969).
256. Id. § 1402(1).
257. HANDBOOK RHA 7100.1, ch. 7, %1.
258. 42 U.S.C. § 1402(1) (Supp.IV, 1969).
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former construction, numerous rent schedules not within the reach of
low-income families could be struck down as arbitrary; whereas under
the latter construction, it would be very difficult to show, even under
the "substantial evidence" test, that a rental increase was not necessary
to improve the efficiency and solvency of the local housing authority.
These examples have been given at length to demonstrate another
point. If the broadly worded statutes and regulations arising under the
Public Housing Act are not construed for the benefit of the low-income
person, HUD and the local agencies can usually demonstrate with substantial evidence that the action is needed for purposes of economy and
efficiency. Rents must be raised to improve the solvency and efficiency
of the agency, repairs are not thoroughly made because of the high expense, citizen participation is not allowed because it "gums up the
works," and a thorough provision of relocation facilities is not made because of the cost and possible delay of the redevelopment program. In
fact, the local agencies and HUD too often act in the name of efficiency
and economy rather than in the best interest and welfare of the lowincome family. If courts do not construe broadly worded statutes and
regulatons arising under the Housing Act for the benefit of the low-income families, then the interests of efficiency, private enterprise, and
the local political majority will prevail, in the normal course of events,
to the detriment of the low-income families. Such a construction for
low-income families is encouraged by the basic purpose of the Housing
Act, which is to protect and benefit low-income families in need of decent housing. It is fairly clear that most of these statutes were broadly
worded in order to permit numerous local variances in the communities
of the local agencies, and not to provide the agency with an excuse for
not administering the Act in the best interest and welfare of the lowincome family.
In Shanks Village Committee v. Cary,-59 the court basically did
apply the construction of a broadly worded statute that is suggested
here. In that case, a class of tenant veterans brought suit against the
Public Housing Administration to enjoin enforcement of a 15 percent
rent increase on the grounds that the increase violated a requirement of
the Lanham Act
that rent be within the financial reach of servicemen
2 °
with families.

The Public Housing Administration defended on the

grounds that the rental increase was necessary due to increased operating costs and that it was authorized under another provision of the
Lanham Act that empowered the Administrator to set rents based on
259.
260.
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42 U.S.C. § 1571 (1964).
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the value of the projects. 61 The court concluded that the basic purpose of the Lanham Act, to provide cheap but adequate housing to
servicemen, and the preponderance of the legislative history of the
specific provision in issue, required a construction that the public housing administration must set rents within the financial reach of the serviceman. The court in Shanks stated that it clearly had the power to establish such a construction.26 2 The APA specifically states that
[t]o the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret
constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine
the meaning
2 63
or applicability of the terms of an agency action.
In two very recent decisions involving racial discrimination in the
selection of sites and placement of tenants by local housing agencies,
the courts have placed very narrow limits on the discretion of the local
agency. In Hicks v. Weaver, 64 the court enjoined the Bogalusa
Housing Authority and HUD from financing and constructing public
housing projects in segregated areas of the city where other sites were
available. Only if the local agency could clearly show that other acceptable sites were not available could it build in segregated areas.
The court in Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority265 went
even further in limiting agency discretion. The court forbade construction of additional units in segregated areas even when other sites
were not available. Furthermore, the court required that for a certain
time period, 75 percent of all public housing in the city must be built in
areas where there is a Negro concentration of no greater than 30 percent
In both Hicks and Gautreaux, the limits on the agency discretion
were made pursuant to constitutional authority and not statutory interpretation as in Shanks. The cases demonstrate, however, the power
and effect of the court in protecting minority rights and effectuating a
fundamental, constitutional policy by strictly limiting agency discretion.
By limiting agency's discretion, the court is not undertaking a
legislative function. The court would be interpreting a statute in light
of the basic purposes of the Housing Act, not establishing a standard
without statutory authority. No doubt, the result may be a greater
expenditure of funds by the agency to provide for repairs, relocation,
261. 197 F.2d at 213.
262. Id. at 217.
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and available housing for those families which are among the lowest
income groups of the community. But is not the purpose of the Housing
Act to provide these benefits and protections? No doubt Congress can
always enact new legislation to clarify its position if a majority in fact
disagrees with the court's action. However, if the courts do not act,
then, most likely, no one else will. The low-income families in need of
housing have little influence in forcing Congress to clarify its standards,
and their interests are not adequately protected and served within their
own local agencies. Without judicial action, interests of those other
than the low-income families will control the administration of the Act,
most likely in contravention of the congressional intent and purposes of
the Housing Act.

